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Introduction  
 
Donors can see how charitable organizations spend their contributions by 
                                                          
1 Il contributo - già apparso su Cardozo Law Review, vol. 35, october 2013, n. 1, pp. 213-265 - è ora 
pubblicato per la cortesia dell’Editore. 
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visiting Internet sites that post extensive financial information about these 
entities2. On these websites, donors can examine how much each charity 
pays its executives, what percentage of its money goes to overhead, how 
much it gives to each cause it supports, how much it pays fundraisers, and 
a host of other data useful for evaluating the charity. Charity watchdogs 
and the press also use this information to monitor tax-exempt 
organizations, asking follow-up questions and exposing corruption when 
they find it. These websites have access to this information because 
nonprofits are required to file publicly available returns with the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS).  
The idea that publicity will encourage honest dealing is the chief 
rationale behind the law that requires each exempt organization to release 
its Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax3. As the 
future Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote, “Sunlight is said to be the 
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman”4. The IRS 
counts on this electric police force to monitor the hundreds of thousands 
of existing charities that it cannot hope to oversee on its own.  
Today, more than 950,000 public charities are registered with the 
IRS, in addition to almost 100,000 private foundations and nearly 500,000 
other types of nonprofit organizations5. These public charities control 
$2.71 trillion in assets and have annual revenues of $1.51 trillion6. Donors 
                                                          
2 The most well-known websites are GUIDESTAR, http://guidestar.org, which obtains 
and posts the actual Forms 990 submitted to the IRS, and CHARITY NAVIGATOR, 
which uses information from the Form 990 to post summary information and ratings for 
many major charities. 
3 Section 6033 of the Internal Revenue Code requires nonprofits organized under 
section 501(a) to file annual “information returns” with the IRS that disclose details about 
the organizations’ gross income, revenue sources, assets, liabilities, net worth, expenses, 
disbursements related to exempt purposes, and compensation paid to directors, officers, 
and certain key employees. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a); IRS Form 990, Return of 
Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2012) [hereinafter IRS 
Form 990]. Under current law, there are only three exceptions to this rule: (1) “churches, 
their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches”; (2) 
organizations whose gross receipts do not normally exceed $5,000; and (3) “the 
exclusively religious activities of any religious order”. I.R.C. § 6033(a). 
4 LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
92 (1914). 
5 Quick Facts About Nonprofits, URB. INST., NAT’L CENTER FOR CHARITABLE 
STAT., http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).  
6 Id. 
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gave $298 billion to nonprofits in 20117. The largest percentage of this 
giving, thirty-two percent, went to religious organizations8. In theory, the 
IRS can use the Form 990 as the basis for an audit of these organizations, 
ensuring that nonprofit insiders are not using their favored tax status to 
enrich themselves at the expense of taxpayers and donors. Donors and the 
press also use this information to monitor the efficiency and commitment 
of nonprofits. The Form 990 facilitates the process of maintaining an 
ethical and effective tax-exempt sector.  
However, there is one giant exception to this financial transparency 
regime: the more than 330,000 churches in the United States9. In 2010, 
contributions to Christian churches alone were estimated to total more 
than $34 billion10. For the most part, neither the IRS nor the public has any 
idea what these churches11 are doing with the donations they receive 
                                                          
7 Id. 
8 Id. This share includes giving both to churches and to other religious organizations.  
9 NAT’L COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A., YEARBOOK 
OF AMERICAN & CANADIAN CHURCHES 2012 377 (2012) (reflecting numbers from 
2010). 
10 Id. at 386. 
11 This paper exclusively uses the word “church” and not temple, synagogue, or 
mosque because it is the term used in the Internal Revenue Code. The Code does not 
define “church,” nor do the Treasury Regulations, but the IRS has developed fourteen 
criteria that it uses to determine whether an entity qualifies as a church. These criteria 
were originally announced in a 1977 speech by the IRS Commissioner and have since 
been adopted by IRS manuals. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS 316 (9th ed. 2007). Some courts have followed these criteria in 
determining the existence of a church. See, e.g., Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Minn. v. United 
States, 758 F.2d 1283, 1286–87 (8th Cir. 1985). The Tax Court has explicitly declined to 
adopt the Service’s criteria as a test, while acknowledging that they may be “helpful”. 
Found. of Human Understanding v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1341, 1358 (1987). The fourteen 
criteria are:  
(1) a distinct legal existence; (2) a recognized creed and form of worship; (3) a definite 
and distinct ecclesiastical government; (4) a formal code of doctrine and discipline; (5) a 
distinct religious history; (6) a membership not associated with any other church or 
denomination; (7) an organization of ordained ministers; (8) ordained ministers selected 
after completing prescribed studies; (9) a literature of its own; (10) established places of 
worship; (11) regular congregations; (12) regular religious services; (13) Sunday schools 
for religious instruction of the young; and (14) schools for the preparation of its ministers. 
Id. It is understood that not all criteria must be met, and the Service has left itself 
considerable discretion by noting that it will also consider “[a]ny other facts and 
circumstances which may bear upon the organization’s claim for church status”. Id. See 
generally Charles M. Whelan, “Church” in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional 
Problems, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885 (1977) (explaining how “church” was defined prior 
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because, under Internal Revenue Code section 6033, churches are exempt 
from the requirement to file a Form 990. In fact, at many churches, donors 
themselves do not even know what is happening to their money. 
As a group, churches have less oversight than any other major 
institution in America today. Although some churches have voluntarily 
implemented different accountability mechanisms, others remain stand-
alone organizations centered on magnetic personalities who control the 
purse strings and exercise tremendous sway over congregants through 
their charismatic leadership. Unlike at other nonprofits, church leaders can 
exert ostensible religious authority over their members. Some even point 
to passages in the Bible or other religious texts to argue that God has put 
them in their positions of authority and that their congregants have a God-
appointed duty to submit to them. At the same time, some of these leaders 
are using charitable gifts to enrich themselves, pushing the legal 
boundaries of what is considered “reasonable compensation”12. 
In 2007, Senator Chuck Grassley sent letters to the leaders of six 
large Christian churches asking them to voluntarily disclose information 
that would normally appear on the Form 99013.Grassley then the ranking 
                                                                                                                                                               
to the IRS’s fourteen criteria). Because churches still dominate the religious landscape in 
America today, a great deal more has been written about them, and this paper relies on 
these sources. However, many of the same policy considerations may also apply to 
mosques, synagogues, and other houses of worship that qualify as “churches”. But see Jeff 
Brumley, Experts Say Financial Transparency, Accountability Key to Church Health: If Money 
Is Mishandled, the Effects Can Give a Bad Name to Entire Sects., FLA. TIMES-UNION, Aug. 
16, 2009, at A1 (noting that many more mosques and synagogues are run by independent 
boards of directors). 
12 The Code prohibits charities from engaging in transactions that constitute private 
inurement. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). In determining whether a private inurement transaction 
occurred, courts have considered factors such as “the lack of evidence that necessary 
services have been performed, the payment of compensation on an irregular basis, and 
payments that reflect not a contractual compensation arrangement, but rather a trustee’s 
need for funds”. DAVID G. SAMUELS & HOWARD PIANKO, NONPROFIT 
COMPENSATION, BENEFITS, AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 26 (1998). Charities can also 
be penalized for excess benefit transactions in which the economic benefit conferred on 
an insider exceeds the value of consideration. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A). See generally 
SAMUELS & PIANKO, supra, at 15–42. The Treasury Regulations define “reasonable 
compensation” as “the amount that would ordinarily be paid for like services by like 
enterprises (whether taxable or tax-exempt) under like circumstances”. Treas. Reg. § 
53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(A). 
13 Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley Seeks Information from Six Media-
based Ministries (Nov. 6, 2007), http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_data 
PageID_1502=12011. The ministries to which Grassley wrote were: Randy and Paula 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 32/2014 
20 ottobre 2014                                                                                                       ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
member of the Senate Finance Committee, explained the purpose of his 
inquiry in a letter to each ministry:  
 
Historically, Americans have given generously to religious 
organizations, and those who do so should be assured that their 
donations are being used for the tax-exempt purposes of the 
organizations. Recent articles and news reports regarding the 
possible misuse of donations made to religious organizations have 
caused some concern for the Finance Committee. Since your 
organization is not required to file Form 990 with the Internal 
Revenue Service, we are requesting that you answer the following 
questions and provide the following information for our review14. 
 
The Iowa senator told the New York Times that the Senate Finance 
Committee selected the six churches based on investigative reports by 
local newspapers and tips from charity watchdog groups15. However, he 
said there was nothing “magic” about the six, and the number could have 
been higher16. Media reports about these ministries included lavish 
expenditures such as corporate jets, Rolls Royces, and $23,000-marble-
topped commodes17. 
Despite the pressure from Grassley and Senator Max Baucus, only 
two of the churches timely responded to the senators’ request18. Three 
others provided late and incomplete responses, and one refused to give 
any information19. On January 6, 2011, Senator Grassley’s office released a 
                                                                                                                                                               
White of Without Walls International Church and Paula White Ministries of Tampa, 
Florida; Benny Hinn of World Healing Center Church, Inc. and Benny Hinn Ministries of 
Grapevine, Texas; David and Joyce Meyer of Joyce Meyer Ministries of Fenton, Missouri; 
Kenneth and Gloria Copeland of Kenneth Copeland Ministries of Newark, Texas; Bishop 
Eddie Long of New Birth Missionary Baptist Church and Bishop Eddie Long Ministries 
of Lithonia, Georgia; and Creflo and Taffi Dollar of World Changers Church International 
and Creflo Dollar Ministries of College Park, Georgia. 
14 Letter from Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator, to Randy and Paula White, Without Walls 
Int’l Church (Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2007/110620071.pdf. 
The other letters are also available on Grassley’s website.  
15 Laurie Goodstein, Senator Questioning Ministries on Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
2007, at A21. 
16 Id. 
17 Id.; Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, supra note 12. 
18 Neela Banerjee, Senator Awaiting Evangelistic Ministries’ Finance Records, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 24, 2007, at A14. 
19 Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley Praises Ministry Accreditation by 
Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability (Mar. 12, 2009), 
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report on the activities of the six churches that highlighted issues for 
further discussion20. At the same time, he asked the Evangelical Council 
for Financial Accountability (ECFA) to consider the issues raised in his 
report and to make recommendations about how to address them21. In 
response, the ECFA formed the Commission on Accountability and from 
various religious and other tax-exempt organizations22. 
In December 2012, the Commission released a report in which it 
recommended that Congress “never pass legislation requiring churches to 
file Form 990 or any similar information return”23. Instead, the 
Commission advised that “[c]hurches should, as a best practice, establish 
appropriate measures to verifiably demonstrate” financial oversight24. In 
other words, the Commission proposed the status quo. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I recounts the evolution of 
the current law mandating information returns and explains why 
churches have been exempt. The information return was first enacted as a 
precedent to the unrelated business income tax, but its purpose has 
evolved substantially since that time. The current law mandating 
information returns has two chief goals: (1) enabling the IRS to ensure that 
tax-exempt entities comply with the law; and (2) providing the public with 
information it needs to hold nonprofits accountable. These purposes apply 
with equal force to both churches and other tax-exempt organizations. 
Part I also considers why Congress has failed to amend the statute 
to require churches to file a Form 990. Following several notable financial 
scandals at churches, religious leaders have come under attack by the 
media and have been questioned by Congress. At several times, bills have 
been drafted in Congress - or even passed by the House - that would have 
removed the exemption and required churches to file a Form 990. Yet the 
                                                                                                                                                               
http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=19780. 
20 Press Release, Senate Finance Committee, Grassley Releases Review of Tax Issues 
Raised by Media-based Ministries (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ 
ranking/release/?id=5fa343ed-87eb-49b0-82b9-28a9502910f7. 
21 Id. 
22 Commission Overview, COMMISSION ON ACCOUNTABILITY & POL’Y FOR 
RELIGIOUS ORGS., http://religiouspolicycommission.org/Content/Summary-of-Commission 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2012). 
23 COMM’N ON ACCOUNTABILITY & POLICY FOR RELIGIOUS ORGS., 
ENHANCING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE RELIGIOUS AND BROADER 
NONPROFIT SECTOR 31 (Dec. 2012), available at http://religiouspolicycommission.org/Com 
missionReport.aspx. 
24 Id. 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 32/2014 
20 ottobre 2014                                                                                                       ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
exemption has survived - not because of sound policy considerations but 
because doing anything that could conceivably be construed as attacking 
religion has been deemed politically dangerous, and elected 
representatives have been afraid to touch the issue. Part I concludes that 
the legislative history of section 6033 reveals no compelling reason for the 
church exemption and that its survival can be attributed to the political 
power of religious leaders. 
Part II discusses recent developments, most notably the advent of 
the Internet, that make public transparency easier and more effective. 
Because Forms 990 are now more accessible to the public than ever before, 
if churches had to file the Form 990, churchgoers would have the ability to 
monitor how churches use their contributions. Indeed, churchgoers are 
well positioned and have good incentives to do so. 
Part III explains why the current law is bad policy and should be 
amended to require churches to file the information return. Applying 
insights from sociology, it discusses the nature of religious authority and 
explains that power structures within churches make it difficult for 
churchgoers to seek transparency and accountability, making it even more 
important for the government to require such transparency. Many 
churchgoers want more transparency from churches and would like a say 
in how their donations are used. Not only would these churchgoers 
welcome government-mandated disclosure, but studies show that they 
would also give more generously in response. In addition, Part III 
contends that, contrary to the assertion of some religious leaders, financial 
transparency is consistent with the teaching of many churches.  
Finally, Part IV briefly dismisses some constitutional objections and 
suggests that the current law itself may violate the Establishment Clause 
because it favors churches over other tax-exempt organizations.  
 
 
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
 
To understand why churches are exempt from filing the Form 990, it is 
first necessary to explore the legislative history of the statute that requires 
the information return. As described in detail below, the purpose of the 
Form 990 has changed since its inception, and it serves a function today 
that would probably have been inconceivable to the legislators who wrote 
the first statute requiring tax-exempt organizations to file an information 
return. As the purpose of the information return has evolved, Congress 
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has, on several occasions, come close to passing bills that would have 
amended the statute to require that churches file a Form 990.  
 
 
A. Early Legislative History of the Information Return Requirement  
 
1 - The Revenue Act of 1943  
 
The requirement that tax-exempt organizations file an information return 
with the IRS is currently codified in section 6033 of the Internal Revenue 
Code. When it enacted the original version of this provision in 1943, 
Congress was concerned that nonprofit entities were using their 
privileged tax status to gain an unfair advantage in competition with for-
profit enterprises25. Testimony before the House Committee on Ways and 
Means reported that some tax-exempt corporations were actively engaged 
in business operations unrelated to their tax-exempt purposes26. 
According to statements made before the Committee, such tax-exempt 
operations had an unfair advantage when competing with privately 
owned businesses subject to income tax because the exempt operations 
could retain and reinvest all their profits, growing their businesses at a 
much faster rate27. As a result, witnesses recommended that such 
                                                          
25 S. REP. NO. 78-627, at 21 (1943) (“[L]arge numbers of these exempt corporations and 
organizations are directly competing with companies required to pay income taxes ... . 
These organizations were originally given this tax exemption on the theory that they 
were not operated for profit, and that none of their proceeds inured to the benefit of 
shareholders. However, many of these organizations are now engaged in operation of 
apartment houses, office buildings, and other businesses which directly compete with 
individuals and corporations required to pay taxes on income derived from like 
operations”.); H.R. REP. NO. 78-871, at 24–25 (1943). 
26 Hearings on Revenue Act of 1943 Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 78th Cong. 217 
(1943) (statement of Morley Wolfe, New York City, National Lawyers’ Guild). 
27 In fact, the competitive situation is more complicated than this simple argument 
would suggest. At least one commentator has suggested that Congress was responding to 
a “paranoid delusion” and that for-profits were never under any real threat from 
nonprofits because nonprofits would have no incentive to increase output and reduce 
prices. William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. REV. 13, 61–68 
(1972); see also Boris I. Bittker and George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit 
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 319 (1976) (“[I]t was never 
made clear why the price level that had maximized both the pretax and after-tax profits 
of the enterprise before the change of ownership would not continue to maximize its 
profits thereafter”.). However, even Klein acknowledged the corporate-level tax may 
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corporation be taxed on the income derived from their unrelated trade or 
business28. 
Noting that it was “without sufficient data to act intelligently” on 
the issue because tax-exempt corporations were not required to file any 
reports with the IRS and the Committee thus had no data on the extent of 
such abuses, the House bill required that tax-exempt entities begin filing 
returns “stating specifically the items of gross income, receipts, and 
disbursements and such other information, and keep such records, as the 
                                                                                                                                                               
provide an incentive for nonprofits to acquire wholly-owned corporations that could, in 
“unusual circumstances” lead to a concentration of nonprofits in certain industries and 
injury to for-profits. Klein, supra, at 63 n.212. Others have agreed that corporate double 
taxation does give nonprofits a slight advantage. See Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair 
Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605 (1989) (arguing that, 
although nonprofit firms would enjoy a slight cost of capital advantage over for-profits, 
nonprofits would have incentives to expand slowly and would be unlikely to massively 
displace for-profits, and that a more important rationale for the UBIT is that it prevents 
the inefficient allocation of resources that would result because wholly-owned 
corporations held by exempt entities would face no corporate-level tax and could thus 
achieve a higher rate of return than investments in companies subject to pre-dividend 
taxation); Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field or Tilting a Level 
One?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857, 868, 876–77 (2007) (arguing that in the absence of UBIT, 
because of corporate double taxation, tax-exempt organizations actually do have an 
advantage when competing for assets otherwise held through corporate equity, but that 
the UBIT overcompensates, putting nonprofits in a worse position when competing for 
such assets because the UBIT does not tax passive investment income, which makes 
holding such investments relatively more profitable for exempt entities). In addition, 
Klein offered the caveat that if for-profit firms have trouble raising capital because of an 
inefficient capital market, nonprofits will have an advantage by being able to accumulate 
more retained earnings, but he found the argument’s “quantitative significance ... open to 
question”. Klein, supra, at 66; see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and 
Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1023–24 (1982) (pointing out that, in the 
absence of UBIT, nonprofits will accumulate retained earnings faster but that the question 
of whether nonprofits will have an advantage over for-profits depends upon the 
efficiency of capital markets: as long as capital markets are efficient, nonprofits will have 
a smaller advantage). For another explanation of Congress’s rationale for imposing the 
UBIT, see Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political 
Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475 (2005) (arguing that 
Congress was aware that it was being inconsistent by imposing a tax on active unrelated 
income but not on active related income or passive income, and arguing that it did so out 
of political motivation to discourage charities from engaging in activities that conflict 
with the public notion of what nonprofits should be doing). 
28 Hearings on Revenue Act of 1943 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 78th Cong. 866 (1943) 
(statement of Morley Wolfe, New York City, National Lawyer’s Guild). 
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue may prescribe”29. The House version of 
the bill exempted religious, educational, and charitable organizations from 
this filing requirement30.  
The Senate added several other exempt categories, including 
organizations for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals and 
Government-owned corporations31. These amendments appeared in the 
final version of the Revenue Act of 194332.31 The Act required all nonprofit 
organizations, other than those exempted, to file annual information 
returns with the IRS33. Congress intended to revisit the issue of taxing 
unrelated business income after the IRS had used the data gathered from 
these information returns to document the prevalence of abuses. The 
Committee on Ways and Means held subsequent hearings on the issue in 
1947 and 194834. 
 
 
2 - The Imposition of the Unrelated Business Income Tax in 1950  
 
Convinced that there was a problem, Congress added a tax on the 
unrelated business income of otherwise tax-exempt organizations as part 
of the Revenue Act of 195035. In the House floor debates, Representative 
Walter Lynch of New York declared that, after a detailed investigation, the 
Treasury Department and the Committee on Ways and Means had found 
that tax-exempt organizations were indeed operating businesses unrelated 
to their tax-exempt purposes and that this practice constituted an abuse of 
their tax-exempt privilege36. For example, a tax-exempt university was 
operating a macaroni company, a piston ring factory, a leather company, 
and a chinaware maker37. Lynch decried the unfairness of allowing such 
subsidiaries to compete with private companies required to pay a tax of 
                                                          
29 H.R. REP. NO. 78-871, at 24. 
30 H.R. 3687, 78th Cong. § 112 (as passed by House, Nov. 26, 1943). 
31 H.R. 3687, 78th Cong. § 112 (as passed by Senate, Dec. 21, 1943); S. REP. NO. 78-627, 
at 21 (1943). 
32 S. REP. NO. 78-627, at 21 
33. Revenue Act of 1943, H.R. 3687, 78th Cong. § 117(a) (1943).  
34 96 CONG. REC. 9365 (1950). 
35 Revenue Act of 1950, H.R. 8920, 81st Cong. § 301 (1950). 
36 96 CONG. REC. 9365 (1950). 
37 Id. at 9366.  
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thirty-eight percent on their profits38. On the basis of that logic, the 
Revenue Act of 1950 made taxable the regular business activities of a tax-
exempt organization that were unrelated to its tax-exempt purpose39. 
However, Congress exempted churches, though it subjected other 
religious organizations to the tax40. 
Significantly, the Revenue Act of 1950 also required, for the first 
time, that exempt organization information returns be made available to 
the public41. This amendment was added by the Senate Finance 
Committee, and it also expanded the scope of information that exempt 
organizations were required to disclose, mandating more extensive details 
on their sources of revenue, accumulation of income, expenses, and 
disbursements42. The Senate delegated to the IRS the task of determining 
the manner in which this information would be made available to the 
public43. The final version of the bill passed by both houses included a 
penalty for the willful failure to furnish information required, but it did 
not stipulate how this punishment would be imposed44.Congress required 
that information returns be available to the public in the belief that 
increased publicity would encourage compliance with the law45. 
 
 
3 - Expanding the Information Return and Unrelated Business Income 
Tax in 1969  
 
Congress and the Treasury found information returns useful for 
monitoring nonprofits, and Congress continued to expand the scope of the 
information return. In 1967, Representative Ryan introduced a bill in the 
House that would have required every tax-exempt organization, including 
churches, to file an annual information return with the IRS, but the bill did 
                                                          
38 Id. 
39 Revenue Act of 1950, H.R. 8920, 81st Cong. § 301 (1950).  
40 H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 108 (1950); S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 105–06 (1950).  
41 Revenue Act of 1950, H.R. 8920, 81st Cong. § 341 (1950).  
42 S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 125–26.  
43 Id. at 126. 
44 Revenue Act of 1950, H.R. 8920, 81st Cong. § 341 (1950).  
45 Federal Tax Laws Applicable to the Activities of Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations: 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 103rd 
Cong. 12 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings on Federal Tax Laws (1993)] (statement of Margaret 
Milner Richardson, Comm’r of Internal Revenue).  
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 32/2014 
20 ottobre 2014                                                                                                       ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
not make it beyond the Ways and Means Committee46. This suggestion 
received more attention two years later. 
In 1969, the Ways and Means Committee heard testimony of 
various abuses committed by tax-exempt foundations47. Incited by recent 
scandals involving private foundations48, a number of witnesses 
recommended that Congress amend section 6033 to facilitate greater 
oversight and public accountability. For instance, the president of the 
Council on Foundations suggested that Congress revise information 
returns “to require more complete disclosure” and “provide meaningful 
information for the public as well as for audit and review purposes”49. He 
advised that all foundations and charitable trusts file both the information 
return and an audit every year and that public access to these materials be 
improved50. 
At least one witness argued that Congress should eliminate all the 
exemptions in section 6033-including the exception for churches-and 
require that every nonprofit file an information return, to be available for 
public inspection51. In a paper submitted to the Committee, law professor 
Lawrence M. Stone urged: 
 
[C]hurches and other heretofore privileged exempt organizations 
should be required to file the same information now generally 
required of most exempt organizations, and should be made subject 
to the unrelated business rules applicable to other exempt 
organizations. To this author it appears that basic equity between 
believers and non-believers requires that churches not be treated 
better than other charities52. 
 
                                                          
46 113 CONG. REC. 6188 (1967); Sharon L. Worthing, Note, The Internal Revenue Service 
as a Monitor of Church Institutions: The Excessive Entanglement Problem, 45 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 929, 933 n.37 (1977).  
47 Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 91st Cong. 
12 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform (1969)].  
48 For instance, the Frederick W. Richmond Foundation, a tax-exempt foundation, was 
used by Frederick W. Richmond to finance Richmond’s campaign for Congress in New 
York’s 14th Congressional District. Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform (1969), supra note 
47, at 213–37 (statement of Rep. John J. Rooney (N.Y.)).  
49 Id. at 110 (statement of David F. Freeman, President, Council on Foundations).  
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 146 (statement of Prof. Lawrence M. Stone, School of Law, University of 
California, Berkeley). 
52 Id. at 181–82.  
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As a result of these and similar comments, the House did pass a bill that 
would have ended the exemption under section 6033 and required 
churches to file information returns53. 
The House bill also made two other notable changes affecting the 
disclosure requirement of section 6033. First, it required that more 
information be provided on the return, including the identities of directors 
and the salaries of highly compensated officers and employees54. Second, 
the House bill imposed a penalty of $10 per day on organizations that did 
not timely file the return55. 
The Ways and Means Committee report explained the rationale for 
these amendments: experience since 1950 had convinced the Committee 
that “more information is needed, on a more current basis, from more 
organizations, and that this information must be made available to more 
people, especially state officials”56. Documented abuses and concerns 
about accountability had apparently convinced the House that no tax-
exempt organizations were immune to scandals and that requiring more 
information to be made available more broadly would help enforce the tax 
laws. The Committee report noted that the new requirement effecting 
disclosure of compensation was “intended to facilitate meaningful 
enforcement of the limitations imposed by the bill”57. 
The Senate added two exceptions to the requirement that all tax-
exempt organizations file information returns: “churches, their integrated 
auxiliary organizations, and organizations and associations of churches”; 
and small organizations having annual gross receipts of less than $5,00058. 
The decision to add these exceptions was made by an executive session of 
the Senate Finance Committee59. The chairman of the Committee, Senator 
Russell Long of Louisiana, submitted into the Congressional Record a 
press release summarizing the actions of the Committee, which explained 
                                                          
53 Tax Reform Act of 1969, H.R. 13270, 91st Cong. § 101(d) (as passed by House, Aug. 
7, 1969).  
54 Id.; S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 53 (1969).  
55 S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 53. The penalty was codified under I.R.C. § 6652(d). See Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, H.R. 13270, 91st Cong. § 101(d). The same penalty could also be 
imposed on the individuals responsible for failing to file the return, but only after 
receiving notice from the IRS. Id.  
56 H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 36 (1969).  
57 Id. 
58 S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 52.  
59 115 CONG. REC. 32148 (1969).  
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that the Committee had exempted churches “in view of the traditional 
separation of church and state”60. However, it noted that churches would 
nevertheless be required to report and pay the unrelated business income 
tax61. 
The conference committee approved the Senate’s version of the 
amendments to section 6033, with one modification: it also exempted the 
exclusively religious activities of any religious order from the filing 
requirement62. 
Significantly, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 removed the unrelated 
business income tax exemption that churches had enjoyed63. The Senate 
Report explained that, although in the past churches had not undertaken 
unrelated businesses, in recent years some churches had “begun to engage 
in substantial commercial activity”64. It noted: “Some churches are 
engaged in operating publishing houses, hotels, factories, radio and TV 
stations, parking lots, newspapers, bakeries, restaurants, etc”.65. The 
Senate apparently saw no constitutional issues with extending the 
unrelated business income tax to churches. 
Since 1969, Congress and the IRS have continued to expand and 
refine the law requiring that exempt organizations file an information 
return. In 1971, the IRS ruled that, for purposes of imposing a penalty 
under section 6652 for failure to file a Form 990, filing an incomplete 
return that lacked “material information” was tantamount to a failure to 
file66. The IRS noted, in explaining its rationale, that the legislative history 
made it clear that Congress intended “to ensure that information 
requested on exempt organization returns was provided timely and 
completely so that the Service would be provided with the information 
needed to enforce the tax laws”67. This ruling was later codified by 
Congress as part of the Revenue Act of 198768. 
                                                          
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 H.R. REP. NO. 91-782, at 286 (1969).  
63 Tax Reform Act of 1969, H.R. 13270, 91st Cong. § 121(a).  
64 S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 67 (1969).  
65 Id. 
66 Rev. Rul. 77-162, 1977-1 C.B. 400.  
67 Id. 
68 Revenue Act of 1987, H.R. 3545, 100th Cong. § 10704(a) (1987). This amendment was 
codified at I.R.C. § 6652(c), which then provided a penalty for a failure to file or “a failure 
to include any of the information required to be shown on a return filed under section 
6033(a)(1) or section 6012(a)(6) or to show the correct information”.  
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B - Televangelist Scandals During the 1980s 
 
Certain religious leaders began to attract attention in the 1970s with the 
increasing popularity of religious broadcasting and the commensurate 
increase in financial resources available to these “televangelists”. A few 
ran into troubles with federal and state regulators. In 1973, Jerry Falwell’s 
church was investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission for 
making “false and misleading” statements about property when it issued 
$2.5 million in church bonds69. Around the same time, the progenitor of 
televangelism, Rex Humbard, was investigated by the Ohio Commerce 
Department for selling “securities” to fund construction projects that 
never materialized70. Other religious broadcasters used pitches that 
stopped short of illegality but still bore the stench of manipulation. For 
example, a popular tactic was periodically warning viewers that the 
ministry would go out of business or cancel its station in “your area” if it 
did not receive a certain level of contributions71. 
Although well known to their viewers and to those federal and 
state regulators they had crossed, televangelists did not emerge as a social 
phenomenon until the late 1970s when some mainline churches began to 
criticize them72. Sociologists of religion Jeffrey K. Hadden and Charles E. 
Swann argued that it was this criticism that propelled televangelists onto 
the national stage73. These attacks and the financial improprieties of some 
televangelists soon attracted congressional attention. 
In 1977, Senator Mark Hatfield warned that Congress would enact 
legislation if evangelical leaders could not develop a proposal to regulate 
themselves74. His chief legislative assistant told a gathering of Christian 
leaders that disclosure was needed and suggested that a voluntary 
program would “preclude the necessity of federal intervention into the 
philanthropic and religious sector”75. Congressman Charles Wilson had 
already drafted disclosure legislation in response to a scandal involving 
                                                          
69 STEVE BRUCE, PRAY TV: TELEVANGELISM IN AMERICA 147 (1990).  
70 Id. at 148. 
71 Id. at 142. 
72 JEFFREY K. HADDEN & CHARLES E. SWANN, PRIME TIME PREACHERS: THE 
RISING POWER OF TELEVANGELISM 3 (1981).  
73 Id. at 4.  
74 Id. at 123. 
75 Id. 
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the misuse of funds raised by a Catholic religious order76. Wilson’s bill 
would have required churches to disclose essentially the same information 
required on the Form 99077. While Catholic and Protestant church leaders 
were vocal in their opposition to Wilson’s bill, they were more open to 
Hatfield’s suggestion that they develop a means to regulate themselves78. 
Thanks to Hatfield’s pressure, the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association 
and the Christian relief organization World Vision partnered to found the 
ECFA in 197979. The ECFA began with 115 members, a number that 
included only one televangelist80.As the coming decade would make 
painfully clear, there was a reason why many religious broadcasters opted 
out of this accountability enterprise. In addition, despite the fact that the 
ECFA was billed as a means for churches to police themselves, very few 
churches ever joined the organization81. 
The presidential election of 1980 brought renown to religious 
leaders like Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell, who were prominent figures 
                                                          
76 Id.; Rick Casey, Pallottines Chief Topic of Meeting, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1976, at B1.  
77 Robert Abelman, In Conversation: Arthur C. Borden, Evangelical Council for Financial 
Accountability, in RELIGIOUS TELEVISION: CONTROVERSIES AND CONCLUSIONS 
185, 185 (Robert Abelman & Stewart M. Hoover eds., 1990); HADDEN & SWANN, supra 
note 72, at 123; Casey, supra note 76; Protestants [sic] Groups Debate Fund-Raising Disclosure 
Bill, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1977, at B5. 
78 David Johnston & Jennifer Leonard, TV Charities: Let the Giver Beware, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 20, 1985, at T3; James Robinson, Churches Plan Fund Disclosure, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 
1977, at 12; Truth in Charity, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1977, at 18.  
79 HADDEN & SWANN, supra note 72, at 22, 123–24.  
80 Id.; Jim Bakker’s PTL would become part of the ECFA in 1981 but withdraw in 1986, 
refusing to submit its audited financial statements and claiming that it had sufficient 
accountability through its denomination. Abelman, supra note 77, at 189. From 1983 until 
its withdrawal from ECFA, the Council and PTL leaders had seven meetings to discuss 
ECFA concerns about tax compliance, overhead costs, the size of PTL’s board, conflicts of 
interest, the culture of extravagance at PTL, and PTL’s unwillingness to supply audited 
financial statements upon request. Id. at 190. 
81 For instance, a Washington Post story heralding the advent of the ECFA misleadingly 
proclaimed: “Fiscal Accountability Arriving for Churches”. George W. Cornell, Fiscal 
Accountability Arriving for Churches, WASH. POST, July 27, 1979, at C18. A Chicago Tribune 
headline similarly declared: “Churches Plan Fund Disclosure”. Robinson, supra note 787. 
Another piece in the Chicago Tribune noted that the ECFA was “founded to encourage 
church groups to voluntarily disclose their financial matters”. Bruce Buursma, What TV Is 
Doing to Religion, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 1980, at A1. Today, of the ECFA’s 1,700 members, 
only about 150 are churches. ECFA, http://www.ecfa.org (based on a search of ECFA 
members with the category “Church: Local” or “Church: Multisite” on the ECFA website, 
eliminating duplicate results) (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).  
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 32/2014 
20 ottobre 2014                                                                                                       ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
in Ronald Reagan’s successful campaign82. Falwell appeared on the cover 
of Newsweek, and his Moral Majority claimed credit for Reagan’s election83. 
The leaders of the “New Christian Right” enjoyed the limelight of political 
power while they and other evangelists continued to reap huge financial 
rewards with minimal federal oversight and no transparency.  
By the mid-1980s, following revelations of embezzlement and tax 
evasion that ultimately ended with the imprisonment of Jim Bakker, the 
public began to question in earnest the activities of many charismatic 
television evangelists, and Congress again discussed the exemption for 
churches under section 603384. By 1986, Bakker’s ministry, PTL85, had been 
accused of misleading its viewers about the use of donations, was being 
investigated by the Department of Justice for fraud, and was under review 
by the IRS for tax evasion86. The next year, PTL revealed that it had been 
paying Bakker at least $1.6 million annually, a figure that it had been 
unwilling to disclose for years, despite dogged attempts by the Charlotte 
Observer and other media groups to make the organization accountable to 
the public87. 
Outraged by the scandal at PTL and questionable practices of other 
televangelists88, Congressman J.J. Pickle, chair of the Subcommittee on 
                                                          
82 HADDEN & SWANN, supra note 72, at 4–5.  
83 Id. at 5–6.  
84 See Federal Tax Rules Applicable to Tax-Exempt Organizations Involving Television 
Ministries: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 
100th Cong. 250 (1987) [hereinafter Hearing on Television Ministries (1987)].  
85 PTL stands for either “Praise the Lord” or “People that Love,” but sardonic critics 
began to suggest that it stood for “Pass the Loot” or “Pay the Lady,” the latter referring to 
the large amount of blackmail hush money Bakker had paid to a woman with whom he 
had had a brief affair. Praise the Lord and Pass the Loot, ECONOMIST, May 16, 1987, at 25.  
86 Charles E. Shepard, Bakker Misled PTL Viewers, FCC Records Show, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Jan. 26, 1986, at 1A; Charles E. Shepard, PTL in Tax Dispute with IRS, S.C. 
Agency, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 24, 1986, at 1A.  
87 BRUCE, supra note 69, at 147; Charles E. Shepard, PTL ’86 Payments to Bakkers: $1.6 
Million, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 18, 1987, at 1A.  
88 Congressman Byron Dorgan of North Dakota noted: “[I]t is clear that at least some 
evangelists have not been able to maintain accountability for the vast sums that they have 
collected. The stories of million-dollar salaries, million-dollar jets, and houses from 
Malibu to Miami raise not only eyebrows but also some questions of reporting and 
accountability”. Hearing on Television Ministries (1987), supra note 84, at 8. At the time of 
the hearing, the IRS was investigating about thirty different evangelists. IRS 
commissioner Lawrence Gibbs noted: “Inurement has taken the form of payment of 
excessive salaries and benefits, including personal residences, automobiles, travel 
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Oversight of the House Ways and Means Committee, convened a well-
publicized 1987 hearing with witnesses from the IRS and the Treasury, as 
well as notable televangelists including Jerry Falwell and Oral Roberts89. 
In his message opening the hearing, Pickle noted that Congress and the 
executive “historically have been reluctant to look very closely at tax 
issues involving religious organizations” because of their political 
sensitivity90. His fears were not unfounded: at the hearing, D. James 
Kennedy, the leader of Coral Ridge Ministries, warned, “I think we need 
to be careful that we do not turn the IRS into a Department of Cults”91. In 
a fundraising letter, the executive director of the National Religious 
Broadcasters went further, accusing Congress of attacking religion by 
holding the hearings and calling them “the beginning of a new 
‘inquisition.’”92.  
Most witnesses were more subdued in their criticisms of the 
Committee hearing, and they generally agreed that Congress was well 
within its constitutional authority when it had imposed the unrelated 
business income tax on churches93. Church leaders disagreed about 
whether Congress should impose the Form 990 filing requirement on 
churches, with some opposing the suggestion and others favoring it94. 
Many insisted that they were able to police themselves, pointing to their 
membership in the ECFA95. However, Oral Roberts contended that the 
ECFA lacked teeth and that it would be better for all organizations to file 
the Form 990 and submit to external audits96. Gordon Loux, the chairman 
                                                                                                                                                               
expenses, and loans, to those in control of the organization. Although funded by the 
general public through contributions, the cases under examination demonstrate a pattern 
of close control and incomplete or nonexistent disclosure to contributors of the actual 
uses made of their money”. Id. at 37.  
89 See id. 
90 Id. at 5 (statement of Rep. J.J. Pickle (Tex.)).  
91 Id. at 69 (statement of D. James Kennedy, President and Founder, Coral Ridge 
Ministries).  
92 Id. at 265–70 (letter from Ben Armstrong, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Religious Broadcasters).  
93 See, e.g., id. at 74, 128 (statements of D. James Kennedy & Jerry Falwell, President, 
The Old-Time Gospel Hour).  
94 See id. at 76, 128 (statements of D. James Kennedy & Jerry Falwell, opposing 
requiring churches to file Forms 990), 159, 198 (statements of Oral Roberts, Oral Roberts 
Evangelistic Association, & Paul Crouch, President, Trinity Broad. Network, supporting 
requiring churches to file Forms 990).  
95 Id. at 61, 132 (statements of D. James Kennedy & Jerry Falwell).  
96 Id. at 158 (statement of Oral Roberts).  
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of the board of the ECFA, defended his organization’s failure to prevent 
the financial abuses at PTL by insisting that there are “inherent difficulties 
in self-regulation” because it is limited to those who consent to be 
regulated97. Loux agreed that the Form 990 was a “minimal requirement 
that ought to be met by those that are operating in the public service”98. 
IRS and Treasury officials also testified alongside the televangelists. 
In his statement before the hearing, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
for Tax Policy, O. Donaldson Chapoton, explained that, in the past, 
churches had not been subject to the requirements of section 6033 because 
of concern about government intrusion into religion99. The Commissioner 
of the IRS, Lawrence Gibbs, agreed with this explanation, but 
Congressman Charles Rangel of New York challenged it in a testy 
exchange with the Commissioner: 
 
Mr. Rangel: Do you see where filing an annual report by churches 
would be in violation of the constitutional right of separation of 
church and state? 
Mr. Gibbs: I have assumed, perhaps erroneously, that that was the 
reason - or certainly one of the prominent reason s- for specifically 
excluding them by statute in 1969. 
Mr. Rangel: Well, why did you reach that assumption? You know, it 
is only a congressional decision. Has any court said that you cannot 
put limitations on the privilege of tax exemption? We do it in 
unrelated taxes. We do it in lobbying. We do it in political affairs. We 
do it in FCC control. What in God’s name could be even remotely 
considered a violation of the constitutional rights of churches to say 
that they should file an annual report as to how much money they 
got and what they did with it?100. 
 
In response to Rangel’s questions, Gibbs agreed to submit for the record a 
statement of the IRS’s official opinion on the matter. In that statement, the 
                                                          
97 Id. at 207 (statement of Gordon Loux, Chairman of the Bd., ECFA).  
98 Id. at 235. However, the ECFA insisted in a 2009 letter to Senator Grassley that 
Gordon Loux did not intend to endorse the requirement that churches file a Form 990. 
Senate Finance Committee, Grassley-ECFA Correspondence 2009, http://www.finance.sena 
te.gov/newsroom/ranking/download/?id=abb25810-a26e-4329-a4ed-424e692eb34f (last visited 
July 7, 2013).  
99 Hearing on Television Ministries (1987), supra note 84, at 22 (statement of O. 
Donaldson Chapoton, Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury for Tax Policy, Dep’t of the 
Treasury).  
100 Id. at 54.  
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IRS took the position that there would be no constitutional problem with 
requiring churches to file the Form 990101. It reasoned that other religious 
organizations did have to file the information return and that churches 
were subject to other federal requirements, including audits102. Chapoton 
conceded that, although it was a “constitutional-type issue,” there was no 
constitutional impediment to requiring churches to file103. 
Both Chapoton and Gibbs agreed that having churches file the 
Form 990 would facilitate enforcement of the tax laws104. Gibbs also 
expressly linked the Form 990 to public accountability and voiced concern 
that churches lacked such accountability: 
 
The Congressional purpose behind the public availability of Form 990 
is that publicity itself is a great check against potential abuses. We 
believe this notion has great merit and a salutary effect on overall 
compliance with the tax laws in the exempt organization area. 
Therefore, when large organizations seeking funds from the general 
public are not required to file Form 990, the benefit of a public 
accounting no longer exists105. 
 
Not only did Congress intend the public inspection requirement to aid 
accountability but, as Gibbs indicated, the IRS agreed that it had actually 
achieved this effect106. 
                                                          
101 Id. at 55 (The IRS statement read: “We are of the opinion that there is not a 
constitutional prohibition on requiring churches to file Form 990 information returns. For 
instance, currently religious organizations that are not churches are required to file Form 
990 and churches, as well as other religious organizations, are subject to detailed 
examinations of their books and records. We believe both of these current law 
requirements are constitutional and, with respect to examinations of books and records, 
can be considered more intrusive than the filing of the Form 990. The only constitutional 
problem we would forsee [sic] in this area would be if a statute differentiated between 
religious denominations in filing requirements in a manner that favored one 
denomination over another. However, we do note that the religious community would 
undoubtedly oppose any new requirement that churches file Form 990. While they may 
argue constitutional concerns, they will most likely emphasize the sensitivity of requiring 
extensive filing by churches as well as the failure to show an adequate change in 
circumstances sufficient to justify the requirement”. (citations omitted))  
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 56.  
104 Id. at 22 (statement of O. Donaldson Chapoton), 33 (statement of Lawrence B. Gibbs 
Jr., Comm’r of Internal Revenue).  
105 Id. at 31 (statement of Lawrence B. Gibbs Jr.).  
106 Id. 
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The 1987 hearings ended without any changes to the law. Pickle’s 
subcommittee continued to monitor the activities of the televangelists, but 
regulatory enforcement in subsequent years was a less public affair107. 
Hadden asserted that the close relationship between the Christian Right 
and Republicans in the White House prevented further inquiries into 
churches during the 1980s108. 
 
 
C - Recent Legislative History of the Information Return 
 
In the past several decades, the policy rationale for information returns, 
and for amendments to the laws and regulations affecting them, has 
shifted even more to their importance for the public. Although the IRS still 
uses the Form 990 as the basis for its audits of exempt organizations, the 
significance of the information return to the public’s assessment of 
charities and donors’ ability to monitor the stewardship of their 
contributions has gained ascendancy.  
 
 
1. The William Aramony Scandal and Aftermath  
 
In 1992, an investigation at the United Way revealed that, in addition to 
drawing a $463,000 salary, CEO William Aramony had diverted funds for 
his personal use and to finance luxuries for his teenage girlfriend109. That 
scandal and other reports of runaway executive compensation at 
charitable organizations prompted public outcry and a congressional 
investigation into the operations of the non-profit sector110. Excessive 
                                                          
107 Jeffrey K. Hadden, Policing the Airwaves: A Case of Market Place Regulation, 8 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 393, 394 (1994).  
108 Id. 
109 Karen W. Arenson, Former United Way Chief Guilty in Theft of More than $600,000, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at A1; Felicity Barringer, United Way Head Is Forced Out in a 
Furor Over His Lavish Style, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1992, at A1. 
110 See, e.g., David Ballingrud et al., Local Charities on the Defensive, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, at 1B (interviewing local charity executives who are worried that 
donors do not understand why they make so much); Clarke Bustard, “We’ve Been Waiting 
for this Call,” RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 26, 1992, at A1 (investigating the 
executive salaries at Richmond-area nonprofits); Linda Eardley, United Way Here Hiked 
Executives’ Pay, in 1991 Spending $844,560 over Income, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 
17, 1992, at 1D (criticizing local United Way for large increases in executive salaries while 
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compensation, interest-free loans, and other extravagant perks uncovered 
in the investigation led to tough questions about the IRS’s ability to 
monitor the nonprofit sector at hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight in 1993111. Noting the declining ability of the IRS to monitor the 
ballooning number of nonprofits112, the hearings focused much of their 
attention on how the law could be changed to make the Form 990 a more 
useful tool for the public. Introducing the first hearing, Chairman J.J. 
Pickle stated:  
 
We want to know if Federal law is adequate to ensure compliance by 
public charities and to appropriately punish wrongdoing. Most 
importantly, we want to know if the public is currently being provided 
access to the information necessary for them to make informed judgments 
about charitable giving113.  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
the organization operated in the red); Judith Nemes, Hospital Executives’ Pay Beginning to 
Raise Eyebrows, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 8, 1992 (detailing recent efforts in state 
legislatures to cap executive salaries at nonprofit hospitals); Dianne B. Piastro, Questions 
to MDA Go Unanswered, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 31, 1991, at 4D (criticizing 
Muscular Dystrophy Association for refusing, in violation of federal law, to turn over 
recent Forms 990); Lynn Simross, Charities in a Bind: Tough Questions in the Aftermath of the 
United Way Scandal, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1992, at C05 (reporting that a Chronicle of 
Philanthropy survey revealed almost 25 percent of charities pay executives more than 
$200,000); Marguerite T. Smith, Which Charity Bosses Earn Their Keep, MONEY, May 1992, 
at 142 (pointing out that many similarly-sized nonprofits pay their CEOs drastically 
different salaries). The committee also referred to a 1993 investigative series in the 
Philadelphia Inquirer, which examined 6,000 tax-exempt charities and found that many 
“make huge profits, pay handsome salaries, build office towers, invest billions of dollars 
in stocks and bonds, employ lobbyists and use political action committees to influence 
legislation”. Hearings on Federal Tax Laws (1993), supra note 45, at 53. In light of such 
stories, Representative Mel Hancock of Missouri lamented:  
It just seems to me that many times we have situations all over the 
country where someone wants to do a lot of good for a lot of people as 
long as he is getting paid to do it. If he is not getting paid to do it, he is 
not interested in helping out these people. Charity used to be a good 
word. It is getting so it isn’t such a good word any more. 
Id. at 52. 
111 Hearings on Federal Tax Laws (1993), supra note 45, at 6 (statement of Rep. J.J. Pickle 
(Tex.)) 
112 Id. at 42 (noting that, although some 30,000 new exempt organizations were being 
added each year, the number of IRS auditors devoted to nonprofits had declined since 
1980). 
113 Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
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In her statement before the hearing, the IRS Commissioner noted that the 
rationale behind the public inspection requirement was the “assumption 
that publicity alone is a check against potential abuses”114. The report 
submitted to the Subcommittee by the IRS stated that the IRS’s experience 
comported with this assumption, noting: “This requirement that public 
charities operate in the ‘sunshine’ advances the Service’s overall goal of 
voluntary compliance”115. As a result, the IRS recommended changes that 
would “enable the public to have greater knowledge of a public charity’s 
operations”116.  
One of the primary concerns raised at the hearings, and in 
contemporaneous news stories117, was the issue of private inurement. The 
IRS Assistant Commissioner in charge of exempt organizations testified:  
 
The abuses that we found in the examination program really center 
on the issue of inurement. Most of them get into the question of to 
what extent assets or other funds within the exempt organizations are 
going to the benefit of the people who control them118.  
 
Pickle read through a litany of suspicious transactions uncovered in the 
250 returns reviewed by his Subcommittee, which included bloated 
salaries (fifteen percent received more than $200,000), executives paid by 
more than one organization, subsidized loans to insiders, extravagant 
expense accounts, lucrative construction contracts with companies 
controlled by board members, and questionable exchanges with taxable 
subsidiaries119.  
The Subcommittee also discovered that many of the forms they 
examined were incomplete120, confirming the results of a 1988 
Government Accountability Office report which found that about half of 
Forms 990 were filled out incompletely121. The IRS representatives agreed 
                                                          
114 Id. at 12 (statement of Margaret Milner Richardson, Comm’r of Internal Revenue). 
115 Id. at 19. 
116 Id. at 20. 
117 See supra note 110. 
118 Hearings on Federal Tax Laws (1993), supra note 45, at 61 (statement of John E. Burke, 
Assistant Comm’r, Emp. Plans and Exempt Orgs., IRS). Howard M. Schoenfeld, the 
Special Assistant for Exempt Organization Matters, IRS, agreed with Burke: “The whole 
question of private inurement is a fundamental issue in any examination of a public 
charity exempt under section 501(c)(3)”. Id. at 55.  
119 Id. at 62–63 (statement of Rep. J.J. Pickle (Tex.)). 
120 Id. at 63. 
121 Id. at 97 (statement of Bennett M. Wiener, Vice President, Philanthropic Advisory 
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with those findings and also with the concern that many organizations 
were refusing to allow the public to actually inspect their Forms 990122. As 
a result of such complaints, the IRS was investigating ways to enhance 
public dissemination of the forms, including the possibility of electronic 
filing123. The Assistant Commissioner agreed that increased public access 
to the forms would help its enforcement efforts124.  
The 1993 hearings prompted a 1994 report by the Department of the 
Treasury and subsequent 1996 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code. 
Penalties for failure to file the Form 990, or for incorrect or incomplete 
returns, were increased under the 1996 Taxpayer Bill of Rights125. Treasury 
had proposed this change in its 1994 report to the Subcommittee on 
Oversight, noting that many exempt organizations were filing incomplete 
or incorrect returns and suggesting that part of the reason for their 
sloppiness may have been that the existing penalties were too low126.  
The 1996 Taxpayer Bill of Rights also made two other important 
changes to the regulation of tax-exempt entities. First, it created 
“intermediate sanctions” that could be imposed on exempt organizations 
that the IRS determined were guilty of private inurement transactions127. 
These sanctions impose excise taxes on individuals who receive “excess 
benefits” from nonprofit entities and on those managers responsible for 
knowingly approving such benefits128. Prior to 1996, the only penalty 
available if a nonprofit engaged in an excess benefit transaction was the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Serv., Council of Better Bus. Bureaus). 
122 Id. at 65–66 (statement of Howard M. Schoenfeld). 
123 Id. at 66. 
124 Id. at 69 (statement of John E. Burke). 
125 Taxpayer Bill of Rights, H.R. 2337, 104th Cong. § 1314 (1996). Penalties for small 
organizations (with gross receipts of less than $1,000,000) were increased from $10 to $20 
per day, and a new penalty of $100 per day was imposed for large organizations. I.R.C. § 
6652(c)(1)(A). 
126 U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Proposals to Improve Compliance by Tax-Exempt 
Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 
103rd Cong. 13, 24 (1994) [hereinafter Hearing on Treasury’s Proposals (1994)] (statement of 
Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy, Dept. of the Treasury). 
127 Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1311 (1996) (codified at I.R.C. § 4958).  
128 I.R.C. § 4958(a). The Code defines an “excess benefit transaction” as “any 
transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt 
organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person if the value 
of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration (including the 
performance of services) received for providing such benefit”. Id. § 4958(c).  
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draconian revocation of the entity’s exempt status129. Revocation was not 
even sure to punish the wrongdoers, making it a frequently meaningless 
penalty. It was also rarely used130, and the IRS Commissioner had noted in 
1993 that having only this sanction made enforcement difficult131.  
Second, the 1996 act made changes that increased the public’s 
ability to access exempt organization information returns. It amended 
Code section 6104 to require, for the first time, that an organization mail a 
copy of its Form 990 to any party that requested it132. Prior to the 
amendment, public inspection had been limited to those individuals 
willing to make a pilgrimage to the organization’s principal offices133. The 
same act also increased the penalty for organizations that refused to make 
their Form 990 available to the public134. 
 
 
2 - Recent Revisions to Form 990  
 
During the last several years, the IRS has focused on redesigning the Form 
990 for the first time in almost three decades. In June 2007, the IRS released 
a draft version of the redesigned Form 990, noting that the new form was 
intended to address three goals: improving transparency; promoting 
compliance with tax laws; and minimizing the burden on filers135. In 
subsequent testimony before a congressional committee, the IRS 
Commissioner for exempt entities explained the importance of 
transparency and public access: 
 
                                                          
129 H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, at 54 (1996).  
130 Hearings on Federal Tax Laws (1993), supra note 45, at 59 (statement of John E. Burke) 
(noting that the IRS had been revoking the tax-exempt status of only about thirty 
organizations per year).  
131 Id. at 9, 11–12 (statement of Margaret Milner Richardson, Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue). Intermediate sanctions had been suggested by the Treasury as early as 1987. 
See Hearing on Television Ministries (1987), supra note 84, at 20 (statement of O. Donaldson 
Chapoton, Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury for Tax Policy, Dep’t of the Treasury).  
132 Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1313 (1996) (codified at I.R.C. § 6104).  
133 Hearing on Treasury’s Proposals (1994), supra note 126, at 13–14 (1994) (statement of 
Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy, Dep’t of the Treasury).  
134 Taxpayer Bill of Rights, H.R. 2337, 104th Cong. § 1313 (1996) (codified at I.R.C. § 
6104); H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, at 60. 
135 Press Release, IRS, IRS Releases Discussion Draft of Redesigned Form 990 for Tax-
Exempt Organizations (June 14, 2007), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Releases-Discussion-
Draft-of-Redesigned-Form-990-for-Tax-Exempt-Organizations.  
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Our second priority is to enhance transparency of the nonprofit sector 
by requiring better data and making that data more publicly 
available. Transparency is the linchpin of compliance, but when the 
structure and operations of charitable organizations are visible to all, 
the possibility of misuse and abuse is reduced. Our transparency 
initiatives include the wholesale redesign of the Form 990 and 
expanded electronic filing136. 
 
That statement and the IRS’s emphasis on improving public access to and 
understanding of the Form 990 again underscore how important the 
public’s role has become in regulating nonprofits. Other testimony before 
the committee by nonprofit industry leaders reinforced the IRS’s message. 
For instance, Diana Aviv of Independent Sector, a coalition of 
hundreds of nonprofits, recommended that Congress mandate electronic 
filing to facilitate posting information online137. The president of the 
Council on Foundations agreed, noting that such laws also increase media 
scrutiny and that news organizations had been very diligent about 
investigating nonprofits in recent years138. Aviv recounted to the 
committee that a series in the Boston Globe prompted the formation of a 
group of twenty-four leaders to study the nonprofit sector, which turned 
into the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector at the instigation of the Senate 
Finance Committee139. The Panel released recommendations to Congress 
in 2005, which included mandatory electronic filing140. In addition, it 
                                                          
136 Hearing on Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of 
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 11 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on Tax-Exempt 
Charitable Organizations (2007)] (statement of Steven T. Miller, Comm’r, Tax Exempt and 
Gov’t Entities Div., IRS).  
137 Id. at 74 (statement of Diana Aviv, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Independent Sector).  
138 Id. at 90 (statement of Steve Gunderson, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Council on Foundations) (“Hardly a month goes by when I’m not spending time with a 
new reporter just assigned to the philanthropic beat of their news agency. And hardly a 
week goes by when we don’t hear from the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Los 
Angeles Times, or the Wall Street Journal”.).  
139 Id. at 106 (statement of Diana Aviv).  
140 PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR ON GOVERNANCE, TRANSPARENCY, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 26 (June 2005), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/Report/fina 
l/Panel_Final_Report.pdf; Press Release, Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Nonprofit Panel 
Recommends More than 120 Actions to Strengthen Transparency, Governance, and 
Accountability in the Charitable Community (June 21, 2005), 
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/press/finalreport/index.html.  
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convened two separate panels to offer additional recommendations on 
changes that “would improve [Form 990’s] value as a reliable and credible 
source of public information”141. 
At the hearing, IRS representatives generally agreed with the 
statements of other Committee witnesses, and the Commissioner noted 
that it was especially important that “obnoxious” expenditures for flashy 
perks show up somewhere on the Form 990 so that there can be a public 
reaction142. 
Those statements all reflect the present importance of the Form 990 
as a tool for public accountability. Recent congressional hearings have 
placed as much -or more- emphasis on its role in promoting public 
monitoring as on its role in IRS audits. The new Form 990 makes it more 
difficult for organizations to hide executive compensation and more 
effectively facilitates the public’s ability to decipher a complex disclosure 
document143. 
 
 
II - Increased public access to and use of Form 990 information returns 
 
Although for a long time, the fact that information returns were open to 
public inspection meant little in practice, in recent years the effect of this 
publicity requirement has become significant. Until 1996, exempt 
organizations were only required to make the Form 990 available at their 
office144. Since few individual donors would actually take the time and 
effort to travel somewhere for the sole purpose of inspecting an 
organization’s information return, the only groups that regularly invoked 
the statute were reporters and charity watchdogs. Even when such 
individuals did seek to review the forms, they frequently met with delay, 
intransigence, and hostility145. Few organizations were eager to turn over 
                                                          
141 PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 140, at 16.  
142 Hearing on Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations (2007), supra note 136, at 104 (2007) 
(statement of Steven T. Miller).  
143 See Sacha Pfeiffer & Beth Healy, New IRS Form Targets Charities’ Salaries, BOS. 
GLOBE, June 17, 2007, at D1.  
144 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.  
145 See, e.g., George Rodrigue et al., For America’s Nonprofit Sector, the Watchdog Seldom 
Barks, NIEMAN REP., Mar. 22, 1998, at 50, 53 (reporting that in 1995, the National 
Committee for Responsive Philanthropy sought to collect the Forms 990 from 174 
organizations, but its two-year effort was successful in obtaining full cooperation from 
only forty-seven nonprofits; ten refused outright to provide the Form 990 and seventy-six 
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their information returns, and some even refused outright to follow the 
law. 
Their unwillingness was no doubt because the press had been - and 
continues to be - effective at uncovering examples of misdeeds and 
extravagances at charities, oftentimes beginning with information 
contained in a Form 990. Newspapers are littered with stories about 
organizations that misused donor funds to pay excessive salaries and 
perks, sometimes while failing to provide promised services. Many high-
profile media investigations have incited the ire of Congress, prompting 
hearings or other investigations. A long Washington Post probe into the 
compensation paid to the head of the Smithsonian eventually led Senator 
Grassley to investigate the institution and put pressure on its board to 
moderate the excessive compensation paid to its CEO146. The institution’s 
chief executive resigned in 2007 from the sustained public pressure147. 
Similarly, a 2003 series in the Boston Globe led the Senate Finance 
Committee to organize the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector in 2005148. 
Another 2003 series in the Washington Post led to a Senate investigation of 
the Nature Conservancy149.  
                                                                                                                                                               
ignored repeated requests); Simross, supra note 110 (reporting that in 1992, many 
charitable organizations made Chronicle of Philanthropy investigators jump through hoops 
to see their Forms 990, including requiring special appointments and refusing access to 
copy machines); see also supra note 122 and accompanying text.  
146 Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley Works to Safeguard Smithsonian 
Resources (Feb. 26, 2007), http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID 
_1502=11438#. The Washington Post had looked into Lawrence Small’s expenses as early 
as 2001, but at the time, Smithsonian officials lied to Post reporters, telling them that 
Small paid for his own charter airfare. A 2007 report by the Inspector General, issued 
after an investigation undertaken at Grassley’s instigation, revealed the untruth. The 
report detailed other extravagant expenses including more charter flights, lavish gifts for 
friends and associates, and an overgenerous housing expense for Small that was based on 
a “‘hypothetical’ mortgage” set at above-market rates. James V. Grimaldi, Smithsonian 
Head’s Expenses ‘Lavish,’ Audit Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2007, at A1.  
147 Jacqueline Trescott & James V. Grimaldi, Smithsonian’s Small Quits in Wake of 
Inquiry, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2007, at A1.  
148 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. The Boston Globe investigation looked 
into the activities of some of the Boston area’s largest private foundations and found that 
many provided opulent salaries to executives that bore little relation to the size of the 
foundations or their charitable activities. For instance, the Paul and Virginia Cabot 
Charitable Trust paid out $400,000 to charities in 2001 while its CEO was paid $1.4 
million. Beth Healy et al., Some Officers of Charities Steer Assets to Selves, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 
9, 2003, at A1.  
149 Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Senate Panel Intensifies Its Conservancy Probe, 
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In other cases, media pressure alone has been sufficient to influence 
nonprofits to change their behavior. For instance, several October 2009 
stories in the Charlotte Observer drove Franklin Graham, the CEO of both 
the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association and Samaritan’s Purse, to take a 
huge pay cut after the newspaper revealed he had taken home $1.2 million 
in 2008150.  
Although in the past such monitoring was mostly restricted to the 
press, the situation has completely changed during the last decade, and 
Forms 990 are now widely available to the public, thanks to the Internet. 
In 1998, the charity watchdog organization Philanthropic Research - better 
known as GuideStar - began to collect and digitize Forms 990151. In that 
year, it published information on 60,000 nonprofits152. The next year, it 
made the front page of the New York Times business section when it posted the 
Forms 990 from 200,000 organizations to its website153. That action was 
hailed by another charity research agency as being the single “most 
important development ever in making charities accountable”154.Other 
organizations and academics had advocated posting all Forms 990 on the 
Internet, arguing that doing so would effectively encourage donors and 
private citizens to police the nonprofit sector155. Arthur Schmidt, the 
president of Philanthropic Research, declared, “We are on the verge of a 
whole new era of nonprofit accountability”156. He predicted, “The 990 will 
move rapidly from being this obscure, obnoxious reporting document to 
                                                                                                                                                               
WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2003, at A1. The Washington Post investigation revealed a variety 
of questionable practices: “Articles detailed how the charity had sold scenic properties to 
its state trustees, who reaped large tax breaks. Other stories disclosed that the charity 
engaged in multimillion-dollar business deals with companies and their executives while 
they sat on the charity’s governing board and advisory council”. Id.  
150 Tim Funk & Ames Alexander, Graham: Take away BGEA Pay, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Oct. 10, 2009.  
151 GuideStar: A Brief History, GUIDESTAR, http://www.guidestar.org/rxg/about-
us/history.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2012).  
152 Id. 
153 Id.; David Cay Johnston, Tax Returns Of Charities To Be Posted On the Web, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 18, 1999, at C1 
154. Johnston, supra note 153.  
155 See, e.g., id.; Peter Swords, The Form 990 as an Accountability Tool for 501(c)(3) 
Nonprofits, 51 TAX LAW. 571, 580 (1998) (arguing that the Form 990 can be very useful for 
catching abuses like self-dealing).  
156 Johnston, supra note 153.  
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 32/2014 
20 ottobre 2014                                                                                                       ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
something informative and acceptable and transform itself into a useful 
document”157. 
With the 2007 redesign of the Form 990, which was motivated in 
large part by the desire to make the document more lucid to the general 
public158, Schmidt’s grand words have proven prescient. Today, GuideStar 
makes available on its website the information returns for all tax-exempt 
organizations that file with the IRS159. Several other organizations, such as 
Charity Navigator, use the Form 990 as a tool to evaluate charities and 
post ratings of major charities on their websites160. Thanks to the Internet’s 
unique ability to widely disseminate information, the congressional 
mandate requiring transparency is more effective today than ever before.  
In addition to direct public oversight, there are a number of other 
advantages to having Forms 990 broadly available. For instance, some 
have argued that suspicious staff members are in a prime position to note 
false or misleading numbers on the information return and can act as 
whistleblowers161. Likewise, board members have an incentive to pay 
closer attention to the organization’s finances and to be more vigilant 
about their oversight role when they know that others can look over their 
back162. Even when nothing illegal has occurred, nonprofit officers and 
directors are likely to be more conscientious about ensuring that 
organizations seem clean and efficient, and that compensation does not 
appear unreasonable.  
Requiring churches to file a Form 990 would guarantee that both 
the public and churchgoers have access to financial information that 
would enable them to monitor how churches are using their donations. 
Such monitoring would make churches accountable to the public and to 
their donors. 
 
 
III - Churches should not be exempt from filing FORM 990 
 
                                                          
157 Id. 
158 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
159 GuideStar: A Brief History, supra note 151.  
160 FAQ for Donors, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm? 
bay=content.view&cpid=484 (last visited July 13, 2013).  
161 Swords, supra note 155, at 582 n.36.  
162 Id. at 582.  
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The reason for exempting churches from filing the Form 990 has evolved 
since the requirement was first enacted. When private businesses 
complained to Congress about having to compete with the tax-free 
subsidiaries of charitable organizations, they were not complaining about 
churches163. So in 1943, when Congress mandated the information return, 
it exempted churches and a variety of other charities that it did not 
consider problematic164. Likewise, when it later enacted the unrelated 
business income tax in 1950, churches were again exempt. However, 
churches lost the latter exemption in 1969 because they had begun to 
engage in commercial operations unrelated to their exempt purposes165. At 
the same time, they nearly lost their exemption from section 6033, saved 
only by a last-minute amendment in the Senate166. That amendment was 
added out of wariness that Congress not step near the line separating 
church and state167. However, given that lawmakers did impose the 
unrelated business income tax on churches at the same time, their concern 
seems incongruous.  
Since 1969, talk of ending the exemption on churches has been 
politically unpopular with religious groups, who have accused members 
of Congress unwise enough to suggest it of being anti-religious168. Given 
the sway that religion has in America today, few elected officials have 
been willing to touch the issue. Even Senator Grassley, who consistently 
receives perfect ratings on the scorecard of the conservative Christian 
Family Research Council169, was accused by some Christian leaders of 
                                                          
163 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  
164 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.  
165 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.  
166 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
167 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  
168 See, e.g., Michael Isikoff, Evangelists Defend Funding Tactics; Decry House Hearings as 
Dangerous Precedent, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1987, at C1. Church leaders have also attacked 
the IRS. See Church Institutions Told to File Informational Tax Returns, WASH. POST., Jan. 
14, 1977, at B14 (describing how eighty religious organizations have vehemently opposed 
proposed IRS regulations to narrow the definition of “integrated auxiliary” in I.R.C § 
6033, requiring more church-related groups to file information returns); IRS Stirs up a 
Storm Among Church Leaders, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 9, 1976 (interviewing 
religious leaders opposed to new IRS regulations stripping religious schools and other 
non-churches of their exemption from the requirement to file a Form 990). 
169 For instance, Grassley received a rating of 100 percent for the 110th Congress. See 
VOTE SCORECARD 110TH CONGRESS, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL ACTION 
(2008), available at http://downloads.frcaction.org/EF/EF08I02.pdf. 
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endangering the First Amendment when he initiated his financial probe of 
six large churches170. 
Aside from political expediency, however, there are few sound 
reasons to justify the continued exemption for churches under section 
6033. The argument that churches do not suffer from the same abuses 
witnessed at other nonprofits does not stand up to scrutiny, as witnessed 
by countless scandals at religious organizations over the last several 
decades. In fact, because of the unique form of control religious leaders 
exercise, churches might actually be more susceptible to abuses. In 
addition, as unpalatable as the suggestion may seem, there are strong 
reasons why many law-abiding churches should favor amending the law-
it could do them good.  
 
 
A - Churches Are Especially Susceptible to Financial Abuses 
 
Two separate questions must be asked when evaluating the financial 
management of churches. The first is: Who makes the decisions about how 
money is spent, including the compensation paid to the pastor? The 
second is: What checks are in place to ensure that the money actually goes 
where it is supposed to be spent? The answer to the first question is 
important for minimizing concerns about private inurement and for 
ensuring that donors have some say in how their contributions are used. 
The answer to the second reveals whether there are opportunities for 
outright criminality in which a church leader might simply steal from the 
congregation’s coffers. Both questions are connected insofar as the 
answers frequently reveal naïveté within religious institutions and suggest 
that many churches need to rethink how much power and control their 
leaders have. The trust accorded to these leaders is unrivaled in other 
sectors, and predictably leads to a climate in which abuse is easy and 
common. Examples of abuse are rampant and make a compelling 
argument that churches should be subject to the same disclosure 
requirements as other nonprofits.  
The first subsection below points out the lack of financial oversight 
in many churches and argues that the resulting high incidence of 
                                                          
170 Jacqueline L. Salmon, Probe Biased, Televangelists Say, WASH. POST, May 24, 2008, 
at B9 (reporting that almost two dozen leaders criticized Grassley’s probe in a letter sent 
to the Senate Finance Committee). 
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embezzlement shows that churches place too much trust in their leaders. 
The next four subsections explore whether and to what extent different 
forms of church governance encourage financial extravagances by church 
leaders, concluding that nearly all churches are vulnerable to financial 
abuse and that government-mandated financial transparency may be the 
only way to correct the situation.  
 
 
1. Many Churches Lack Basic Forms of Oversight and Accountability, 
Revealing Too Much Trust in the Honesty of Religious People  
 
Many churches have been victimized by embezzlement, a crime to which 
they are especially susceptible due to the level of trust inherent in 
relationships built on shared religious beliefs. A report released in 2007 by 
the Center for the Study of Church Management at Villanova University 
found that eighty-five percent of the Catholic dioceses responding to the 
survey reported being victimized by embezzlement during the previous 
five years171. Economist Charles Zech, the director of the center, stated:  
 
Every church has the same problem of being too trusting of their 
priests and ministers and church workers. It’s not unique to the 
Catholic Church ... No one would think that a priest would embezzle, 
and no one would think that a church worker would, so they don’t 
put in the kinds of internal controls common in the business world172.  
 
Another study found that in 2000, an estimated $7 billion was embezzled 
by leaders of churches and religious organizations in the United States173. 
Several other studies have suggested that about fifteen percent of all 
individual churches will suffer embezzlement174.  
Indeed, in many ways, the accountability structures at some 
                                                          
171 Tom Heinen, More Financial Accountability Sought, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
May 16, 2008, at B1. 
172 Id. As one pastor who was bilked by another told the New York Times, “We never 
doubted, because since he was a minister, we never thought he would lie to another 
minister”. David Gonzalez, A Pastor’s Job Offers Become a Curse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 
2010, at A21. 
173 JANET T. JAMIESON & PHILIP D. JAMIESON, MINISTRY AND MONEY: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR PASTORS 117 (2009). 
174 John B. Duncan & Morris H. Stocks, The Understanding of Internal Control Principles 
by Pastors, 14 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 213 (2003). 
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churches encourage financial mishandling: very few churches have sound 
financial management and accountability plans in place175. A survey of 
internal control mechanisms at 530 churches showed that most churches 
had weak internal controls, especially with respect to cash disbursements 
and reporting176. Another survey of 317 churches found that more than 
half of the respondents were missing a number of important control 
mechanisms177. For instance, at seventy percent of churches the same 
person was responsible for writing checks and reconciling bank 
statements178.  
Many church leaders do not know where to begin when it comes to 
financial management. As the executive director of the National 
Leadership Roundtable on Church Management, a nonprofit formed in 
2005 to advise the Catholic Church on financial issues, noted: “Many 
priests ... are not trained in management or finance or human resources 
development, and seminaries rarely offer this type of curriculum”179. 
Another survey of clergy found that only seven percent were satisfied 
                                                          
175 Id.; Denise Nitterhouse, Financial Management and Accountability in Small, Religiously 
Affiliated Nonprofit Organizations, 26 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. S101, 
S106–07 (1997). Consider these observations from an attorney regarding the level of 
financial management at many churches:  
I have had significant experience in working with churches that have decided, after 
many years of operation, to establish their exempt status by filing a Form 1023 with the 
IRS. In virtually all of these cases, the hardest information to obtain was financial 
statements that made sense and actually balanced. This is because these churches 
operated, in many cases, out of a checkbook. Often, the treasurer was a volunteer with no 
experience in developing budgets or setting up financial statements.  
Position Papers, COMMISSION ON ACCOUNTABILITY & POL’Y FOR RELIGIOUS 
ORGS., http://religiouspolicycommission.org/PositionPapers.aspx?q=Recent (last visited Dec. 
28, 2012). 
176 Thomas C. Wooten, John W. Coker & Robert C. Elmore, Financial Control in 
Religious Organizations: A Status Report, 13 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 343, 
362 (2003). For instance, one in five churches rarely required written documentation of 
expenses before reimbursement, and two-thirds of churches required only one signature 
on checks. Id. at 355; see also JASON BERRY, RENDER UNTO ROME 151 (2011) 
(examples of Catholic parishes where priests were able to approve their own expense 
reports).  
177 John B. Duncan, Dale L. Flesher & Morris H. Stocks, Internal Control Systems in US 
Churches: An Examination of the Effects of Church Size and Denomination on Systems of 
Internal Control, 12 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 142, 151 (1999).  
178 Id. 
179 Katie Zezima, Ministries Begin a Focus On Management Skills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 
2007, at B5.  
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with the financial training they received during seminary180. Yet only 
fifteen percent of those surveyed were interested in receiving more 
training on the subject181. Even when churches employ full-time staff to 
handle their finances, that staff is often untrained in accounting and lacks 
the skills necessary to design appropriate internal controls182. This lack of 
training and apparent disinterest in financial management predictably 
leads to poor financial controls, making it easy to abuse the system. Many 
churches have suffered the consequences of such a lax environment183. 
Although requiring churches to file a Form 990 would not 
magically prevent embezzlement or improve financial oversight, the 
redesigned Form 990 contains a number of questions regarding 
governance and accountability practices, including questions about the 
independence of directors, conflicts of interest, whistleblower protections, 
auditing, and disclosure184. Requiring churches to complete the Form 990 
would force them to think through issues that many seem to have 
neglected. As some have noted, transparency alone has the capacity to 
influence organization behavior185. Arguably, making churches disclose 
their governance and accounting practices would pressure them into 
adopting practices recommended by the IRS186. Additionally, the lack of 
sophistication and undue level of trust revealed by the financial abuses in 
many churches presents a strong argument that churches are not 
equipped to police themselves. An environment of secrecy only 
                                                          
180 Daniel Conway, Clergy as Reluctant Stewards of Congregational Resources, in 
FINANCING AMERICAN RELIGION 95, 97 (Mark Chaves & Sharon L. Miller, eds. 
1999).  
181 Id. at 99.  
182 Wooten, Coker & Elmore, supra note 176, at 346, 351 (citing other studies).  
183 See, e.g., Francis J. Butler, Financial Accountability: Reflections on Giving and Church 
Leadership, in GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH 153, 154 (Francis Oakley & Bruce Russett, eds. 2004) (listing 
examples of large embezzlements suffered by the Catholic Church); ANSON SHUPE, 
SPOILS OF THE KINGDOM: CLERGY MISCONDUCT AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY 
27–36 (2007) (recounting numerous examples of embezzlement, financial fraud, and other 
economic crimes perpetrated by church leaders).  
184 See IRS Form 990, supra note 3; James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s 
Nonprofit Corporate Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 567–78 (2010).  
185 See Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public Disclosure as a 
Regulatory Tool, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 183, 213 (2012).  
186 See Fishman, supra note 184, at 568.  
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exacerbates the situation and discourages questions that otherwise might 
uncover criminality. 
 
 
2 - Churches Where Power is Concentrated in the Hands of One Leader 
Provide the Ideal Structure for Financial Abuse 
 
Churches vary widely in their management frameworks and in how 
financial and compensation decisions are made. Traditionally, formal 
church governing structures have been divided into three broad 
categories: episcopal, presbyterian, and congregationalist187. The first form 
is generally hierarchical, the second representative, and the third 
democratic, but there are wide variations within each category188. How 
budgeting decisions are made varies within and across denominations: in 
some churches, the pastor controls the budget; others have a board or 
similar committee; and sometimes the congregation approves the 
budget189. 
However, even when congregations have the opportunity to vote 
on the budget, they may have only a vague knowledge of what they are 
approving because of the ubiquitous secrecy attendant to church 
finances190. As two sociologists studying church giving observed: “It is our 
impression that many people who give money [to churches] have the 
uneasy feeling that their money disappears into a black hole”191. In a 
                                                          
187 EDWARD LEROY LONG, JR., PATTERNS OF POLITY: VARIETIES OF CHURCH 
GOVERNANCE 2 (2001)  
188 Id. at 8–9.  
189 DEAN R. HOGE ET AL., MONEY MATTERS: PERSONAL GIVING IN 
AMERICAN CHURCHES 36 (1996). For instance, Baptist and Lutheran congregations 
vote to approve the church budget. Id. Budget decisions at Catholic parishes are always 
made by the clergy, but thirty percent of parishes have a lay council to advise the priest 
even though the priest has the final say. Id.; LONG, supra note 187, at 23. Presbyterian 
churches have a rule that the church’s board must approve the budget, but it is not 
consistently followed. HOGE ET AL., supra at 36. In Assemblies of God churches, 
sometimes the pastor has total control, but at other times a board or the congregation 
approves the budget. Id. But see Werner Cohn, When the Constitution Fails on Church and 
State: Two Case Studies, 6 RUTGERS J. LAW & RELIG. 2 (2004) (“Most people who have 
been members of any of the main-line churches and synagogues have observed that the 
formal democracy enshrined in the official documents is little more than window-
dressing. The decisions are frequently made by the small group of leaders”).  
190 HOGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 7.  
191 CHRISTIAN SMITH & MICHAEL O. EMERSON, PASSING THE PLATE: WHY 
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significant number of churches, no information is available about the 
pastor’s salary, and sometimes even the level of congregational giving is 
entirely secret192. 
A fourth category of church government is the nondenominational 
church, or the sole evangelist, who may not have to answer to anyone and 
may operate in near total secrecy193. Although no religious denomination, 
regardless of governing structure, is immune from financial abuses, 
particular concern should be paid to institutions in the latter grouping194.  
The structure and history of a number of churches, especially those 
churches operating outside an established denomination, suggest that lead 
pastors exert extraordinary influence over financial management. For 
instance, some churches were founded by, or experienced dynamic 
growth under, a charismatic leader whose identity is inextricably tied to 
the church itself195. Sociologist Nancy Ammerman found that members of 
a conservative church she studied described themselves as being part of 
                                                                                                                                                               
AMERICAN CHRISTIANS DON’T GIVE AWAY MORE MONEY 185 (2008).  
192 HOGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 7. The president of the ECFA has also stated that 
churches usually do not disclose their pastor’s salary. Eric Gorski, The Gospel of Prosperity, 
DENVER POST, Oct. 8, 2006, at A-01.  
193 LONG, supra note 187, at 8; WARREN COLE SMITH, A LOVER’S QUARREL 
WITH THE EVANGELICAL CHURCH 216 (2008); Peter Dobkin Hall, Accountability in 
Faith-Based Organizations and the Future of Charitable Choice (Nov. 2002) (unpublished 
paper presented at the 2002 Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and 
Voluntary Action (ARNOVA) conference), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/phall 
/ARNOVA-FB0%20ACCOUNTABILITY.pdf.  
194 See HOGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 5; ANSON SHUPE, IN THE NAME OF ALL 
THAT’S HOLY: A THEORY OF CLERGY MALFEASANCE 4–6 (1995).  
195 See, e.g., Jeff Sharlet, Inside America’s Most Powerful Megachurch, HARPER’S MAG., 
May 2005, at 40–54 (New Life Church in Colorado Springs was founded by Pastor Ted 
Haggard out of his basement and grew to 11,000 members). Even after a scandal forced 
Haggard out, the church’s amended bylaws vested full control in the senior pastor and a 
board of elders nominated solely by the senior pastor himself. NEW LIFE CHURCH, 
BYLAWS OF NEW LIFE CHURCH (AMENDED AND ADOPTED MAY 13, 2008), 
available at http://www.newlifechurch.org/db_images2/NLCBylaws51308.pdf; John Blake, 
Bishop’s Charity Generous to Bishop: New Birth’s Long Received $3 Million, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Aug. 28, 2005, at A1 (Bishop Eddie Long grew his church from a 300-member 
church to a 25,000-member megachurch); About Us, HERITAGE CHRISTIAN CENTER, 
http://heritagechristiancenter.com/about (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (Bishop Dennis Leonard 
expanded his church from his basement to a $15 million, 150,000-square-foot facility). 
Anson Shupe notes that abuse is especially likely to run unchecked in such 
congregations, escalating over time, and may be stopped only when secular agencies 
intervene. SHUPE, supra note 194, at 104. 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 32/2014 
20 ottobre 2014                                                                                                       ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
“Pastor Thompson’s church,” rather than by the name of the church196. 
Fellow sociologist Jackson W. Carroll reported that conservative 
Protestant and historically black churches have a “long tradition of 
charismatic and often autocratic leaders who make most decisions about 
congregational life”197. Although some of those churches have been 
becoming more democratic in recent years, the old style of leadership still 
persists198. 
In many notable instances, the pastor and a hand-picked cabal, 
which may include family members, control the reins of the church199. J. 
Lee Grady, the editor of a national magazine devoted to writing about 
charismatic churches, has observed: 
 
There are many independent churches out there today that are 
accountable to no one. Their board structures are controlled by a few 
insiders and no one can bring correction. That is not healthy200. 
 
Similarly, Edward LeRoy Long, an expert on church governance, has 
written that many individual evangelists have no one to answer to and do 
                                                          
196 E. BROOKS HOLIFIELD, GOD’S AMBASSADORS: A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN 
CLERGY IN AMERICA 338 (2007).  
197 JACKSON W. CARROLL, GOD’S POTTERS: PASTORAL LEADERSHIP AND THE 
SHAPING OF CONGREGATIONS 132 (2006).  
198 Id. 
199 This is how the ministries queried by Grassley are organized. Press Release, 
Senator Chuck Grassley, supra note 13. For instance, Kenneth Copeland’s church bylaws 
give him veto power over board decisions, and the board consists almost entirely of his 
friends and family. Some board members are also paid. Eric Gorski, Relatives of 
Televangelist Prosper, USA TODAY, July 27, 2008, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday. 
com/news/nation/2008-07-26-1101161740_x.htm. Similarly, the New York Times reported that 
the National Baptist Convention, then headed by the disgraced Henry Lyons, “has given 
its presidents such autonomy that they have been able to run the convention’s business - 
including millions of dollars in membership money - from a briefcase”. Rick Bragg, A 
Preacher’s Faithful Back Both Sinner and Felon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at A14; see also 
Michelle Boorstein, In Va., a Powerful and Polarizing Pastor, A Loudoun Minister Inspires 
Loyalty From Followers, Anger From Ex-Members With Torn Lives and Moral Pain, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 16, 2008, at A1, (Sterling, Virginia pastor Star Scott has controlled all finances 
at his megachurch since 1996); Molly Worthen, Who Would Jesus Smack Down?, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Jan. 11, 2009, at 20 (Seattle megachurch pastor Mark Driscoll effectively 
excommunicated elders who disagreed with his plans to consolidate power in his own 
hands).  
200 Blake, supra note 195.  
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as they please, “without regard to the responsibilities that attend 
institutional definition”201. 
Bishop Eddie Long, one of the ministers investigated by Grassley, 
has made no secret of the fact that he controls every decision at his church. 
In his book Taking Over, he wrote about how he became frustrated with 
the deacon board’s “gripping the purse strings” at his church and 
subsequently took full control202. Many of the most notorious 
televangelists likewise dominated their churches; Robert Tilton even 
reorganized his ministry as a sole proprietorship so that he would have 
unfettered access to its finances203. 
Even those independent churches that make overtures toward 
financial accountability cannot always be trusted. Bishop Dennis Leonard, 
the pastor of a megachurch in Denver that once owned a corporate jet, 
claimed that an outside independent board set his salary, but he refused to 
disclose who sat on the board204. According to a former elder, Leonard 
used to receive $750,000 per year205. The financial extravagances and 
fundraising abuses of the Bakkers were approved by the “yes-men” who 
served on their board206. Many other televangelist churches also had 
boards, but in nearly every case, the pastor maintained the authority to 
appoint and dismiss board members at whim207. 
In a recent study, sociologist Christopher P. Scheitle found that the 
presence of a governing board did nothing to restrain the compensation 
paid to leaders of evangelistic organizations named for those leaders: 
Their compensation averaged $24,000 more than the leaders of other 
similar nonprofits208. As Scheitle observed: “[M]any governing boards 
may just serve as symbolic structures without any real power”209. When 
are able to increase their compensation beyond accepted norms210. 
                                                          
201 LONG, supra note 187, at 8.  
202 Blake, supra note 195.  
203 SHUPE, supra note 194, at 74.  
204 Gorski, supra note 192.  
205 Id. 
206 JEFFREY K. HADDEN & ANSON SHUPE, TELEVANGELISM: POWER AND 
POLITICS ON GOD’S FRONTIER 11 (1988); SHUPE, supra note 194, at 71.  
207 HADDEN & SHUPE, supra note 206, at 129.  
208 Christopher P. Scheitle, Leadership Compensation in Christian Nonprofits, 70 SOC. OF 
RELIGION 384, 403–04 (Winter 2009).  
209 Id. at 403.  
210 Id. at 405.  
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Unsurprisingly, such concentrated power has a tendency to 
corrupt. In addition to the notorious abuses during the age of televangelist 
empires, contemporary examples of financial extravagances and 
improprieties persist, despite the tight secrecy over finances at many such 
institutions. For instance, Bishop Eddie Long also controls several non-
church charitable organizations, which the Atlanta Journal-Constitution 
reported gave him more than $3 million in compensation over a four-year 
period, including the use of a $350,000 Bentley211. Virginia pastor Star 
Scott exercised his complete control over church finances to purchase a 
fleet of racing cars for his personal use, prompting an IRS investigation212. 
In addition to criticism over his bloated salary, Bishop Dennis Leonard 
received media scrutiny after allegations of a “kick-back scheme” at a 
nonprofit operated by his church led the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development to temporarily suspend its partnership with the 
nonprofit213. 
Abuses encouraged or allowed by the governing structures of these 
churches are only exacerbated by their opacity. Churches of all kinds have 
a reputation for secrecy214 - like the Catholic Church, which long covered 
up sexual abuse by priests and the use of church funds to settle related 
lawsuits215. However, as sociologist Anson Shupe has argued, at churches 
with a congregationalist-type structure in which there is no authority 
higher than the individual church’s own pastor, malfeasance is more likely 
to be “normalized,” and those who know about abuses are more likely to 
act as accessories than to impose any check on the behavior216. For 
example, the Bakkers and Robert Tilton had a number of individuals in 
their organizations who knew about their fraudulent financial dealings, 
yet chose not to challenge their leaders and instead joined in and profited 
from the illegalities217. In hierarchical churches, even though improprieties 
                                                          
211 Blake, supra note 195.  
212 Michelle Boorstein, IRS Is Investigating Finances, Pastor of Sterling Church Says, 
WASH. POST, July 31, 2009, at B03.  
213 Gorski, supra note 192.  
214 HOGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 7.  
215 Jack McCarthy, The Ingredients of Financial Transparency, 36 NONPROFIT & 
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 156, 157 (2007). See generally SHUPE, supra note 193, at 79–116 
(describing how Catholic bishops and other Church leaders lied to, threatened, paid off, 
and otherwise coerced complainants of sexual abuse into silence). 
216 SHUPE, supra note 194, at 59–77.  
217 Id. at 71–76. 
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may be covered up in the short-term, they are more likely to be corrected 
in the long-run218. In churches that have no higher governing authority, 
abuses are more likely to run unchecked until outside intervention by the 
press or the government puts an end to such behavior219. 
 
 
3 - Even at Churches with More Independent Boards, Leaders Still 
Maintain Undue Influence 
 
Compared to the above examples of churches where decisions are made 
solely by the pastor and self-appointed cronies, the control exercised by 
religious leaders in other church polities seems benign. However, even at 
churches where compensation is set by an ostensibly independent 
committee - as it might be at many Presbyterian churches220 - scholarship 
in management theory suggests that these pastors likely still have a great 
deal of personal influence over boards. 
For instance, recent studies have argued that setting executive 
compensation is not an “arm’s-length” transaction and that, rather, 
managerial power has a strong influence over compensation levels 
approved by directors221. Some of the reasons why managers can exert this 
influence also apply to the church context. First, studies show that the 
psychological forces of friendship and collegiality make directors unlikely 
to disagree with executives on compensation matters222. This influence 
will be even stronger within the church structure, where those setting the 
pastor’s compensation have probably known the pastor for a substantial 
period and interact as friends in a variety of contexts. 
Second, directors are used to deferring to the CEO’s vision and 
guidance, which makes them less able to be objective when deciding on 
                                                          
218 Id. at 59–60. 
219 Id. at 62.  
220 LONG, supra note 187, at 64.  
221 See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: 
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 17 J. APPLIED 
CORP. FIN. 8 (Fall 2005). 
222 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 221, at 13.  
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compensation223. Again, the tendency to defer to the leader will be even 
greater in a church context where the pastor is also a spiritual leader224. 
Finally, if the CEO has also had a role in appointing directors to the 
board, empirical studies have shown that the resulting sense of loyalty 
makes them even more likely to unquestioningly approve outsized 
compensation packages225. Thus, if the pastor is perceived to have a large 
role in choosing lay leaders, they will be psychologically inclined to defer 
to his judgment. This is especially true at some churches where the pastor 
personally selects all of the members of the board226. 
Other studies have shown that CEOs with longer tenures generally 
have higher compensation, and some authors have hypothesized that the 
longer CEOs have been in control of their companies, the more influence 
they will have over the board because they will have had a role in 
selecting more directors227. Thus, an entrenched CEO can build up support 
on the board. Likewise, a long-serving pastor has likely garnered 
significant loyalty and power. Consistent with that suggestion, Scheitle’s 
study of compensation paid to charismatic evangelists showed that the 
presence of a governing board did nothing to restrain compensation228. 
Still other scholars have suggested that the correlation between 
tenure and compensation may be due to the control over information that 
more established executives have; they are more able to dictate the agenda 
and to withhold negative information229. Again, those factors will play 
with at least equal force inside a church, where veteran pastors will have 
become almost institutionalized in their roles and where, for many, the 
                                                          
223 Id. 
224 See infra Part III.A.4. 
225 Brian G.M. Main, Charles A. O’Reilly III & James Wade, The CEO, the Board of 
Directors and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4 INDUS. & 
CORP. CHANGE 293–332 (1995). 
226 225 See, e.g., NEW LIFE CHURCH, supra note 195 (only the pastor has the power 
to nominate elders); Nick Pinto, Lead Us Not Astray, Reverend James Cooper, VILLAGE 
VOICE, Dec. 12, 2012, at 1 (rector of Trinity Wall Street must annually reappoint all 
members of the vestry and chooses the committee that nominates new vestry 
members). 
227 See Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, Chief Executive Compensation: A 
Study of the Intersection of Markets and Political Processes, 10 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 121, 
124, 129–30 (1989). 
228 Scheitle, supra note 208, at 403–04. 
229 See Charles W.L. Hill & Phillip Phan, CEO Tenure as a Determinant of CEO Pay, 
34. ACAD. MGMT. J. 707, 708–09 (1991) 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 32/2014 
20 ottobre 2014                                                                                                       ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
pastor is the church. In addition, even at Presbyterian churches ostensibly 
governed by lay leaders, the pastor presides over meetings and can 
therefore set the agenda230. 
Finally, some academics have suggested a correlation between the 
incomes of board members themselves and compensation provided to the 
executive231. In setting the CEO’s salary, the members of the compensation 
committee may be inclined to define “reasonable” remuneration in 
comparison to their own salaries232. This effect may be even more 
pronounced on nonprofit boards, where directors are just as likely as 
corporate directors to have high incomes and be members of the elite, and 
where they have fewer incentives to engage in oversight, less training in 
board management, and fewer regulations233. Since survey data suggests 
that, for most denominations, those congregants chosen to serve in lay 
leadership are usually wealthier than average, they may be more inclined 
to approve high pastoral compensation because it is similar to their 
own234. In contrast, if all lay members were aware of the pastor’s salary, it 
                                                          
230 LONG, supra note 187, at 71. 
231 See Charles A. O’Reilly III, Brian G. Main & Graef S. Crystal, CEO Compensation 
as Tournament and Social Comparison: A Tale of Two Theories, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 257, 261–
62, 270–71 (1988). 
232 Id. 
233 See Consuelo Lauda Kertz, Executive Compensation Dilemmas in Tax-Exempt 
Organizations: Reasonableness, Comparability, and Disclosure, 71 TUL. L. REV. 819, 853–54 
(1997). 
234 The U.S. Congregational Life Survey, conducted in 2001, surveyed 300,000 
attendees at churches across the country. One of the questions it asked was: “Do you 
currently have any of the following roles here? Member of the governing board.” For 
most denominations, the percentage of attendees answering “Yes” to this question rose 
as income rose, with the highest percentage of “Yes” answers coming from those 
making more than $100,000 per year. This trend was observed at the Church of the 
Nazarene, “fast growing” Presbyterian churches, Seventh Day Adventist churches, and 
United Church of Christ churches. It was also true in the random sample drawn from 
all of the survey respondents. At Lutheran churches, non-fast growing Presbyterian 
churches, and ethnic Presbyterian churches, the percentage of “Yes” answers rose 
steadily with income until the top bracket, when it dropped slightly. In the Southern 
Baptist churches, the highest percentage of “Yes” responses came from the top income 
bracket, but the next highest income bracket ($75,000 - $99,999) was slightly lower than 
the one below it ($50,000 - $74,999). The United Methodist Church was the only 
denomination that did not exhibit a positive correlation between income and service 
on the governing board. Data Archive, ASS’N OF RELIGION DATA ARCHIVES, 
http://www.thearda.com/Archive/ browse.asp (last visited July 17, 2013). More information 
on the U.S. Congregational Life Survey can be found on its own website. About U.S. 
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would be less likely to be set as unreasonably high as if it were set by a 
committee composed only of wealthy members with no oversight or 
transparency. 
 
 
4 - The Nature of Spiritual Leadership Gives Church Pastors 
Extraordinary Power 
 
The problems with independence and objectivity noted above are only 
exacerbated within the context of church leadership because congregants 
place greater trust in their spiritual leaders and the power dynamic is even 
more unequal. Sociologists of religion have identified aspects of spiritual 
leadership that make its power dynamics particularly troubling. For 
instance, Shupe has offered five reasons why religious power is 
particularly strong235. 
First, power in religious hierarchies is more unequal than in other 
institutions, and Shupe has identified at least three reasons for this 
inequality236. The first reason is that religious leaders generally have 
special training or certification, and many denominations teach that 
leaders have been “called” by God237.  
Second, followers are prone to a “group-think” mentality, believing 
that their leaders have superior spiritual wisdom, and become accustomed 
to deferring to them238. Third, even the vocabulary employed by many 
Christian congregations in which the leader is the “shepherd” and the lay 
members are the “flock” creates a dynamic in which the leader can lay sole 
claim to the vision of the institution239. 
Second, this power gap inevitably gives leaders exaggerated 
authority, sometimes including a monopoly over religious sacraments240. 
                                                                                                                                                               
Congregations, U.S. CONGREGATIONS, http://www.uscongregations.org/aboutus.htm (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2012). It is not necessarily the case that these governing boards set, or 
even know, the pastor’s salary. 
235 SHUPE, supra note 194, at 27–31. 
236 Id. at 28. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 28-29. 
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For instance, Catholic Church leaders have used the threat of sacramental 
sanctions to pressure laity into obedience241. 
Third, churches are “trusted hierarchies,” meaning that 
subordinates generally “trust or believe in the good intentions, nonselfish 
motives, benevolence, and spiritual insights/wisdom of those in the upper 
echelons (and often are encouraged or admonished to do so)”242. For 
instance, when the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) was confronted 
with calls for the laity to have a role in church leadership, it responded by 
admonishing the laity that they were to “obey the pastor”243. The 
president of the SBC went so far as to accuse the laity of being “anti-
pastor” for wanting some say in the leadership of the church244. 
Fourth, these hierarchies create the perfect environment for leaders 
to exploit those under their trust because the structures make malfeasance 
easy to commit and to hide245.Most pastors, even those inside of organized 
denominations, operate without supervision and do not have to report to 
anyone246.Psychologists warn that the ministry field is “hazardous,” and 
that the stressful and isolating job of being a pastor, combined with an 
environment of trust, can easily lead to transgression247.In a recent survey 
of 180 seminaries, many agreed that clergy malfeasance was a “significant 
issue”248. Survey results on incidence of clergy sexual abuse are 
particularly troubling. In a confidential survey from the mid-1980s, twelve 
percent of respondents admitted to having had sex with someone under 
their pastoral care249. This rate exceeds comparable numbers for 
professional psychologists and psychiatrists, suggesting that churches as 
institutions have not done enough to curb such abuse250.Other surveys 
have found similarly high rates of clergy admitting to affairs or other 
                                                          
241 Michael P. Hornsby-Smith, Some Sociological Reflections on Power and Authority in the 
Church, in GOVERNANCE AND AUTHORITY IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC 
CHURCH 12, 14 (Noel Timms & Kenneth Wilson, eds. 2000). 
242 SHUPE, supra note 194, at 29. 
243 HOLIFIELD, supra note 196, at 338. 
244 Id. 
245 SHUPE, supra note 194, at 29. 
246 LARRY A. WITHAM, WHO SHALL LEAD THEM? THE FUTURE OF MINISTRY IN 
AMERICA 170 (2005). 
247 Id. at 169. See generally PAUL DAVID TRIPP, DANGEROUS CALLING: 
CONFRONTING THE UNIQUE CHALLENGES OF PASTORAL MINISTRY (2012). 
248 WITHAM, supra note 246, at 169. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
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inappropriate sexual behavior with congregants; in a few studies, as many 
as a quarter of pastors admitted to such behavior251.Clergy counselor John 
O. Lundin cautioned that misconduct is nearly inevitable and that when 
handled secretly and not confronted, it only grows252.Yet most churches 
lack accountability structures to investigate or stem such misconduct. 
Fifth and finally, Shupe has argued that the existence of trusted 
hierarchies “systematically provides opportunities … for such deviance 
and, indeed, makes deviance likely to occur”253. In other words, abuse “is 
‘normal’ to religious hierarchies in a social structural sense”254. Similarly, 
historian Philip Jenkins has contended that the lack of internal and 
external controls in many religious institutions encourages clergy 
deviance255.The numbers on clergy sexual abuse cited above bear 
testimony to the truth of arguments that churches, as institutions, do 
indeed foster malfeasance. 
Besides sociologists and church history scholars, Christian 
counselors and theologians have also noted that trusted religious leaders 
exhibit a proclivity to abuse, which is exacerbated by the dynamics of 
religious authority256.The position of trust and respect held by the abuser 
makes it easier to manipulate and silence victims257.Those who confront 
pastors about sexual abuse, financial improprieties, or even theological 
concerns may be told that they are “unsubmissive” or “disloyal”258. Clever 
abusers turn the conversation away from the legitimate problem and onto 
                                                          
251 SHUPE, supra note 183 at 9–10; Jeff T. Seat, James T. Trent & Jwa K. Kim, The 
Prevalence and Contributing Factors of Sexual Misconduct Among Southern Baptist Pastors in 
Six Southern States, 47 J. OF PASTORAL CARE 363 (1993). 
252 WITHAM, supra note 246, at 172. 
253 SHUPE, supra note 194, at 30. 
254 Id. at 31. 
255 Philip Jenkins, Creating a Culture of Clergy Deviance, in WOLVES WITHIN THE 
FOLD 118, 120, 131 (Anson Shupe ed., 1998). 
256 See, e.g., DAVID JOHNSON & JEFF VANVONDEREN, THE SUBTLE POWER OF 
SPIRITUAL ABUSE (1991) (explaining how religious leaders use “spiritual abuse” to 
manipulate those under their control); JAMES NEWTON POLING, THE ABUSE OF 
POWER: A THEOLOGICAL PROBLEM (1991) (discussing the problem of confronting 
sexual abuse in the Protestant church, including the many ways that religious leaders 
use their positions to both take advantage of victims and keep them silent). 
257 POLING, supra note 256, at 23, 36. 
258 JOHNSON & VANVONDEREN, supra note 256, at 68–69; SHUPE, supra note 183, at 
72–73. 
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the person confronting the leader, accusing that individual of various 
spiritual problems259. 
Richard Laughlin, in a study of financial accountability in the 
Church of England, observed that this pattern of spiritual manipulation 
makes it difficult for lay people to call for their leaders to be financially 
accountable260.He reported: 
 
[C]ongregational members both constitute parishes as well as being 
the supplier of parochial resources yet they are reluctant to call for 
greater accountability from their clergy and parish leaders more 
generally-somehow this is deemed unspiritual and inappropriate261. 
 
Laughlin stated that because of this attitude, lay pressure to make 
churches more accountable is “largely impossible”262. If church members 
are unable or unwilling to call for more accountability, then increased 
transparency and accountability can only come from pressures outside the 
church. 
Both theory and practice present a strong argument that churches, 
as they currently exist, actually foster and shelter malfeasance. The 
dynamics of religious leadership discourage laypeople from pressing for 
financial accountability even in more democratic polities, suggesting that 
it is imperative for the government to apply the same laws to churches 
that mandate transparency for other nonprofits. 
 
 
5 - Hierarchical Churches also Lack Proper Financial Oversight, and Lay 
Members Have Little Say in Accountability 
 
Decisions in the Catholic Church are made in a top-down fashion in which 
bishops are in total control over their dioceses263.As an editorial in the 
National Catholic Reporter lamented: “Bishops answer to Rome, and, 
presumably, to God, but not to [priests] and certainly not to the people in 
                                                          
259 JOHNSON & VANVONDEREN, supra note 256, at 19–20. 
260 Richard Laughlin, A Model of Financial Accountability and the Church of England, in 
MANAGING THE CHURCH? ORDER AND ORGANIZATION IN A SECULAR AGE 49, 
71 (G.R. Evans & Martyn Percy eds., 2000). 
261 Id. at 71 n.5. 
262 Id. at 71. 
263 LONG, supra note 187, at 14. 
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the pews”264. Indeed, the Catholic Church is the least democratic of the 
major denominations, and its finances are largely opaque265.Yet despite 
the higher degree of centralized control, the Catholic and Episcopal 
churches have been at least as victimized by embezzlement as their 
slightly more democratic counterparts266.These observations are consistent 
with the observations of those who have studied accountability structures 
within these churches. In fact, as Shupe has argued, the hierarchical model 
may actually increase incidence of malfeasance in the short-run because 
such church leaders are adept at preventing word of abuse from leaking 
out beyond the church267.Consistent with this argument, religion scholars 
Eugene Bianchi and Rosemary Radford Ruether reported: 
 
One can point to the Vatican bank scandals a few years ago or to the 
cover-up of pederasty … In both cases, secrecy and nondisclosure 
ruled the day. Tragic events came to light only after years of hidden 
abuse. Full accountability concerning the use of money and property 
on all levels of the church does not obtain. This or that church leader 
may be accountable to the people, but specific structures of 
accountability are lacking. Catholic monarchy lends itself to secrecy 
and nondisclosure. … The wider community of the laity is to pay and 
obey, but not be privy to the inner sanctum of church finances and 
decisions about property268. 
 
Such emphasis on obedience and rhetoric about placing the interests of the 
Church above that of the individual269 have left a laity that is too often 
                                                          
264 BERRY, supra note 176, at 113. 
265 HOGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 7, 36. 
266 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
267 SHUPE, supra note 194, at 59–60. 
268 Eugene C. Bianchi & Rosemary Radford Ruether, Toward a Democratic Catholic 
Church, in A DEMOCRATIC CATHOLIC CHURCH 248, 258 (Eugene C. Bianchi & 
Rosemary Radford Ruether eds., 1992). 
269 Peter C. Phan, A New Way of Being Church: Perspectives from Asia, in 
GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH 178, 181 (Francis Oakley & Bruce Russett eds., 2004) (During the sexual 
abuse crisis, bishops often placed the supposed interests of the Church, including the 
preservation of its reputation, above those of the individual victims.); WITHAM, supra 
note 2465, at 63 (Massachusetts Attorney General Thomas F. Reilly observed after an 
investigation of the Archdiocese of Boston, “When they had a choice between protecting 
children and protecting the church, they chose secrecy to protect the church.”). 
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cowed into obedience by “autocratic” pressure from bishops and 
priests270. 
Unequal power in religious hierarchies underscores the importance 
of putting into place sound systems of financial accountability. As Shupe 
has urged: 
 
[C]hurches and denominations are unequal hierarchies of power that 
provide the context for all the malfeasance. That’s our given. Thus, 
are we not going to need some internal realignments of power?271 
 
Indeed, a first step to realigning power within churches should be 
removing the asymmetries of information. Lack of knowledge is 
disempowering, and transparency may be the first step towards greater 
accountability. However, an understanding of the dynamics at work in 
religious institutions makes it seem implausible that this impetus for 
transparency will come from within the church. Instead, it reinforces the 
argument that some churches may only adopt transparency measures if 
required to do so by law. 
 
 
B - Churches Themselves Would Benefit from Increased Transparency and 
Accountability 
 
For the churches that do handle their money with integrity, requiring 
greater transparency for all churches could help the honest ones in at least 
three ways. First, it would give donors greater confidence, making them 
more willing to give. Second, it would help avoid the fallout that 
accompanies news of scandals at similar churches, which almost 
invariably impacts donor giving, even to innocent institutions. Finally, it 
would mitigate the damage that is done to religious faith when clergy 
misconduct is discovered.  
 
1 - Greater Transparency May Increase Donations  
 
A number of studies have demonstrated that donors are more willing to 
give to organizations when they believe their contributions are being well-
                                                          
270 Hornsby-Smith, supra note 241, at 14. 
271 SHUPE, supra note 194, at 146. 
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spent272.Several surveys have made similar findings in the specific context 
of churches.  
In a 2006 study, sociologists Christian Smith and Michael Emerson 
surveyed churchgoing Christians regarding their giving practices and 
beliefs273.Nearly one in ten churchgoers reported that a primary reason why 
they did not give more was that “I do not trust those to whom I would 
give money to spend it wisely, there would be too much waste and abuse 
of donations”274. In written responses and interviews, others also 
expressed reservations about the lack of transparency in their churches or 
denominations275.After comparing those results with other data on 
American attitudes about giving, Smith and Emerson concluded:  
 
[A] significant increase in the public transparency, accountability, 
and institutionalized credibility of the many religious and charitable 
causes and organizations to which American Christians might 
consider giving money would have the real effect over time of 
considerably increasing the amount of money they give276. 
 
In interviews conducted by Smith and Emerson, some pastors also 
expressed concern that scandals involving religious leaders had made it 
more difficult for parishioners to trust churches and therefore more 
hesitant to give277. 
In another recent study, sociologists Brandon Vaidyanathan and 
Patricia Snell noted that several of the churchgoers they interviewed 
emphasized the importance of knowing how their donations were being 
spent278.For those respondents, knowledge regarding how their churches 
                                                          
272 Kertz, supra note 233, at 859–60; Margaret F. Sloan, The Effects of Nonprofit 
Accountability Ratings on Donor Behavior, 38 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 
220 (2009) (finding that “pass” ratings from the Wise Giving Alliance had a statistically 
significant effect on the amount of donations received, though the effect of a “did not 
pass” rating was insignificant); Sally Beatty, How Charities Can Make Themselves More 
Open, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2007, at R1 (reporting that a study at the Center on 
Philanthropy at Indiana University showed that wealthy Americans would give more to 
charities that tightly controlled administrative costs and more effectively used 
donations). 
273 SMITH & EMERSON, supra note 191, at 7. 
274 Id. at 79. 
275 Id. at 79–81. 
276 Id. at 143. 
277 Id. at 106. 
278 Brandon Vaidyanathan & Patricia Snell, Motivations for and Obstacles to Religious 
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were spending money was an important consideration in their decisions 
to attend a particular church and to give to that church279.Vaidyanathan 
and Snell concluded that for some respondents, knowledge that their 
contributions were being carefully stewarded served as an incentive for 
giving280. 
In a study funded by the Lilly Endowment that sought to learn why 
Catholic giving had declined relative to that of other faiths, researchers 
determined that giving rates within the Catholic Church varied in 
proportion to transparency and accountability281.As Francis J. Butler, the 
president of Foundations and Donors Interested in Catholic Activities, 
Inc., summarized the results: 
 
[I]t was a question of participation. Catholics in generous parishes, 
Lilly found, invariably had a strong sense of belonging and church 
ownership and those parish cultures were administratively and 
pastorally transparent282. 
Commenting on the same study, Zech wrote: “People who believe that 
they have some say in the Catholic Church, who believe what they say is 
valued, give more”283. In fact, another study found that forty percent of 
Catholic parishioners believe that churchgoers should withhold donations 
from the Church until they have more say about finances284. For those 
                                                                                                                                                               
Financial Giving, 72 SOC. OF RELIGION 189, 202–03 (2011). 
279 Id. One respondent stated: 
We know very clearly where [the money] is going. We sit in a congregational 
meeting and we see the budget and we can see what a huge percentage of the money 
goes directly to mission (...). That’s what I like about [the church], because I really 
trust what they are doing with [the money] here. 
Id. at 203. Another stated: “I definitely have a heart for missions and want to make 
sure that ... people in our local community have that support, especially with the 
economic crisis that’s happening now.” Id. 
280 See supra note 279. 
281 Butler, supra note 183, at 153, 157. 
282 Id.; see also CHARLES E. ZECH, WHY CATHOLICS DON’T GIVE ... AND WHAT 
CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 82–89, 128–29 (2006). 
283 Butler, supra note 182, at 158. That recommendation is consistent with earlier 
recommendations made by sociologist Andrew Greeley who contended, on the basis of 
research completed during the 1980s, that Catholic laity would be more generous if 
they had a say in deciding how their contributions were spent. See ANDREW GREELEY 
& WILLIAM MCMANUS, CATHOLIC CONTRIBUTIONS: SOCIOLOGY AND POLICY 
81–83 (1987). 
284 NAT’L LEADERSHIP ROUNDTABLE ON CHURCH MGMT., THE CHURCH IN 
AMERICA: LEADERSHIP ROUNDTABLE 2004 79 (2004), available at 
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laypeople, increased transparency and accountability would certainly 
translate into more donations.  
The results of those studies mirror findings from the 1992 Economic 
Values Survey, conducted under the direction of sociologist Robert 
Wuthnow, which asked respondents a series of questions about whether if 
a church made various changes, those changes would make the 
respondent more or less likely to give to the church. Nearly forty-eight 
percent of respondents said that they would be more likely to give to a 
church “if [they] understood better what the church does with its 
money”285. The only other prompt that resulted in a higher percentage 
(sixty-two percent) saying they would be more likely to give was “if the 
church were doing more to help the needy”286. Those prompts trumped all 
others, including a number of self-interested suggestions such as “if the 
preacher gave better sermons” (nineteen percent), “if my family were 
benefiting more from the church’s programs” (thirty-five percent), and “if 
I had fewer economic needs myself” (forty-seven percent)287.  
Similar results from numerous studies strongly suggest that 
churchgoers would give more money to churches if they knew where their 
contributions were going, and if they had some voice in decisions about 
the use of those funds288. 
                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.nlrcm.org/TLR/documents/ Final%20Report.pdf. 
285 Economic Values Survey, 1992, ASS’N OF RELIGION DATA ARCHIVES, 
http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Codebooks/ECON_CB.asp (last visited July 17, 2013). 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 If it is true that congregants would give more to churches that are transparent and 
where congregants have a voice in financial decisions, then why do churches not 
voluntarily make themselves transparent and accountable? First, it should be noted that 
some do. Obviously, at least some churches in the Lilly Endowment study were more 
open than others. Second, there are costs associated with transparency and 
accountability. For instance, joining the ECFA requires churches, depending upon size, to 
have independently prepared financial statements and periodically obtain outside audits, 
which may be a cost that outweighs the benefit in the mind of church leaders. ECFA 
Annual Accreditation Requirements, ECFA, http://www.ecfa.org/Content/Membership-
Requirements (last visited Nov. 30, 2012). Likewise, filing the Form 990 is an added cost, 
requiring time and proper record-keeping. Third, church leaders may be worried that 
laypeople will not like what they see when the books are opened. Although there may be 
a popular perception that ministers sacrifice a lot to lead their congregations, many of 
them do quite well financially. Most pastors probably make more than the majority of 
those in their congregation, which may lead some individuals to decrease their giving. 
For instance, the average compensation to senior pastors in 2009 was more than $80,000 
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2 - Requiring Transparency Would Mitigate the Inevitable Fall in 
Donations from Scandals at Similar Institutions  
 
The second reason why churches would benefit from widespread 
transparency is that donations nearly always fall in the wake of a financial 
scandal, as donors become skeptical not just of the guilty organization but 
also of similar organizations289.Inasmuch as government-mandated 
transparency could minimize such scandals at churches, it would be a 
boon to those churches that operate with integrity.  
A brief survey of news stories yields numerous examples of 
declining charitable contributions in the wake of revelations that donors’ 
money is not being handled with integrity290. Churches themselves 
                                                                                                                                                               
per year, with nearly twenty-five percent making more than $100,000 (including both 
salary and benefits). RICHARD R. HAMMAR, THE 2010-2011 COMPENSATION 
HANDBOOK FOR CHURCH STAFF 24 (2010). This amount far exceeded the median 
household income, which was only about $50,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008 7 
(2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf. Considering that 
about half of pastors make even more than the average, and sometimes quite a bit more, 
concerns about jealous laypeople may cause pastors to keep this information secret. (Of 
course, if the laity would in fact decrease their level of giving if they knew how much the 
pastor actually made, this presents an even stronger argument that the exemption from 
filing the Form 990 favors religion, violating the Establishment Clause. See infra, Part IV.) 
And if pastors are more concerned about maximizing their own salary than they are 
about maximizing donations to their church, then transparency will probably not be in 
their own interest—even if it is in the interest of their church and those they claim to 
serve (the classical principal-agent problem). Fourth, as noted supra Part III.A.1, church 
leaders are rarely sophisticated when it comes to financial matters, and even if added 
transparency might lead to more donations, pastors may not be quick to change long-
standing practice.  
289 Donations also fall in the wake of other scandals. For instance, the Catholic Church 
saw a drop in giving following the clergy sexual abuse scandals. See ZECH, supra note 
282, at 141. 
290 For instance, the William Aramony scandal and a few other, more minor problems 
at local chapters of the United Way had significant and protracted impacts on donor 
generosity. See, e.g., Dave Berns, Local United Way Weathering National Scandal, LAS 
VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 27, 1994, at 1F (Las Vegas–area donations fell seventeen percent 
short of expectations in aftermath of Aramony scandal); Bruce Kauffman, United Way’s 
New Mission: Make Itself Accountable to Donors, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Dec. 4, 2006, at 45 
(donations to the United Way of San Diego fell twenty-five percent, partly in response to 
Aramony scandal); Ellen M. Perlmutter, A United Front: Donations in Annual Charity Drive 
Bounce back after Some Rough Times, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 1, 1996, at F8 
(donations in the Pittsburgh area took four years to return to normal following Aramony 
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experienced the power of public distrust following the well-publicized 
televangelist scandals of the late 1980s.  
The reputations of evangelical ministries were seriously tarnished 
by scandals during that period, and even those that were innocent did not 
escape public aspersion. A 1986 Gallup poll showed that few Americans 
trusted Christian broadcasting, and the study’s authors surmised that 
“there have been extravagances and questionable tactics, and surely this 
has soured people’s attitudes toward giving and toward Christianity”291. 
Even religious broadcasters that had experienced no scandals saw 
donations drop as much as thirty-three percent292.  
In 1987, a Harris poll found that sixty-nine percent of Americans 
thought television preachers did more harm than good, with even forty-
                                                                                                                                                               
scandal); Lori Rodriguez, Wake-Up Call Answered: Diversity in Fund Raising Pays off for 
United Way, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 15, 1996, at 33 (donations in Houston took three years 
to return to normal following Aramony scandal); Jeffrey Rose, United Way May Slash 
Charities’ Money, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 10, 1992, at A-1 (charitable 
organizations in the San Diego area received cuts of as much as fifty-three percent 
because of shortfall at United Way following scandal); Jacqueline L. Salmon & Peter 
Whoriskey, Problems Behind Us, Charity Says; United Way Partnership Divides Area 
Employees, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at B01 (problems at the United Way of the 
National Capital Area, including $1.5 million in questionable payments to its CEO, led 
large companies like ExxonMobil and Giant Food stores to scale back their donation 
programs); Troy Segal & Christina Del Valle, They Didn’t Even Give at the Office, BUS. 
WK., Jan. 25, 1993, at 68 (some local chapters raised fifteen percent less in donations in 
wake of scandal); Charles E. Shepard, A Year Later, United Way Still Faces Investigations, 
Morale Problems, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1993, at A4 (national United Way has slashed 
budget from $30 million to $21 million and donations have fallen about $92 million in 
light of Aramony scandal); Deborah Sontag, Affiliates Feeling Pinch of United Way Scandal, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1992, at A1 (“unprecedented numbers” of employees at companies 
in the New York area canceled pledges after news of scandal); Steve Twedt, Divided Way? 
The Rise in Donations Earmarked for Specific Charities Troubles United Way, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 27, 2002, at A1 (reports of abuse have led increasing numbers of 
skeptical donors to earmark United Way funds for specific charities); Todd Wallack, 
PipeVine Scandal Deters Giving, S.F. CHRON., June 10, 2003, at B1 (donations to local 
United Way down eighteen percent after its contractor misused funds); Marketplace: 
United Way Announces New Guidelines to Help Local Chapters Define their Mission and 
Improve Accountability (Minnesota Public Radio, Mar. 30, 2005) (donations to United Way 
are still down despite overall rise in charitable giving because of several high-profile 
scandals in the organization, beginning with Aramony). 
291 Robert Abelman, The Selling of Salvation in the Electronic Church, in RELIGIOUS 
TELEVISION: CONTROVERSIES AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 77, at 173, 179. 
292 Id. 
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one percent of the viewers of such programming agreeing293.A majority 
(fifty-four percent) of those same followers also agreed that the preachers 
were only in it for the money294.Compared to before the scandals, all 
television preachers became less popular, even those that had been 
untouched by scandal295.The secular media, meanwhile, racked up record 
ratings in their coverage of the disintegrating televangelist 
empires296.Jeffrey K. Hadden argued that these fallen televangelists 
fulfilled the Elmer Gantry stereotype and that they did serious damage to 
the ministries of even upright preachers297. The skepticism bred from these 
scandals has had a long-term negative impact on the public’s perception of 
television preachers298. 
 
 
3 - Financial and Other Scandals, Caused or Exacerbated by Lack of 
Transparency, Have the Potential to Damage the Spiritual Lives of 
Churchgoers  
 
A lack of transparency fosters an environment in which abuses can 
flourish, and the ensuing scandals are bad for churches financially and 
spiritually. As Shupe has observed, the impact of financial and sexual 
scandals “can subvert and shatter individuals’ faith and cause great 
emotional and social damage”299. For instance, in the fallout from a recent 
scam perpetrated by a pastor in Brooklyn, many of those victimized left 
the church300.The leader of another church lamented, “I am concerned 
people are walking away saying you can’t trust preachers”301. Sociologist 
and Methodist minister Jackson W. Carroll has noted that it is “tragically” 
painful when the person who proves untrustworthy is supposed to be 
“God’s representative”302. It is not hard to imagine the damage that such a 
                                                          
293 Praise the Lord and Pass the Loot, supra note 85, at 26. 
294 Id. 
295 HADDEN & SHUPE, supra note 206, at 16. 
296 Jeffrey K. Hadden & Anson Shupe, Elmer Gantry: Exemplar of American 
Televangelism, in RELIGIOUS TELEVISION: CONTROVERSIES AND CONCLUSIONS, 
supra note 77, at 13, 17–18. 
297 Id. at 18–19. 
298 Hadden, supra note 107, at 408.  
299 SHUPE, supra note 194, at 6. 
300 Gonzalez, supra note 172. 
301 Id. 
302 CARROLL, supra note 197, at 154. 
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scandal can do to the faith of churchgoers who have placed so much trust 
in their pastor.  
For church leaders genuinely interested in their congregation’s 
spiritual health and conscious of the inherent temptations to abuse power 
and money, transparency may be one of the best guards against the 
damage such scandals inevitably cause. 
 
 
C - Many Churchgoers Would Likely Welcome More Financial 
Transparency 
 
Congregants would also welcome more financial transparency at their 
churches. As Zech wrote with respect to his research on giving:  
 
We asked the question in a number of different ways, and each time 
the answer came out the same. Parishioners want more say about 
how their parishes are run. … They want to be consulted and have 
direct input into decision-making processes. In parish financial 
matters they expect accountability and transparency303. 
 
Those observations may seem obvious to most donors but, as noted above, 
such accountability and transparency is lacking in most Catholic dioceses 
and many Protestant churches.  
Many Catholic parishioners called for greater financial 
transparency in the wake of the clergy sexual abuse scandals, pointing out 
that the financial secrecy of the church was one of the factors that allowed 
leaders to keep the magnitude of the scandal quiet for as long as they 
did304.A 2002 Gallup poll found that sixty-five percent of Catholics agreed 
that the church should be more accountable for its finances, and seventy-
nine percent wanted bishops to give a complete account of the financial 
impact of sexual abuse victim settlements305.A study conducted by the 
National Leadership Roundtable on Church Management found that a 
majority of Catholics wanted “full financial disclosure” from the church, 
and eighty percent believed that lay people should have a say in how their 
donations are spent306.Some Catholic leaders have even spoken out on this 
                                                          
303 ZECH, supra note 282, at 128–29. 
304 Robert West & Charles Zech, Internal Financial Controls in the U.S. Catholic Church, 9 
J. OF FORENSIC ACCT. 129 (2008). 
305 Butler, supra note 183, at 156. 
306 NAT’L LEADERSHIP ROUNDTABLE ON CHURCH MGMT., supra note 284, at 79. 
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subject, advocating more transparency. James L. Heft, a priest and the 
founding director of the Institute for Advanced Catholic Studies at the 
University of Southern California, has written: 
 
I believe that all bishops should annually publish an audit of the 
financial status of the diocese, including the amount paid to victims 
of sexual abuse. Laity who are expected to donate to the church need 
to know that their donations will be used for the purposes for which 
they are given. All these practices call for a greater honesty on the 
part of at least some bishops than has been the case307.  
 
When the church has been more transparent, church donors have 
welcomed it. As the Lilly Endowment study found, parishioners value it 
when their leaders are more open and when the laity believes that they 
have a voice in church affairs308.  
In its struggle to recover credibility following revelations of sexual 
abuse, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston commissioned a 
“Financial Transparency Project”309. Under the leadership of new 
Archbishop Sean O’Malley, it sought to “open the books,” utilizing a 
commission of lay volunteers as well as professional auditors310.In his 
review of this project fostering unprecedented transparency, Jack 
McCarthy noted that the public reaction has been “overwhelmingly 
positive”311. 
Considering how invested many laypeople already are in their 
churches, attending weekly services and probably also volunteering 
                                                          
307 James L. Heft, Accountability and Governance in the Church: Theological Considerations, 
in GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH 121, 125 (Francis Oakley & Bruce Russett eds., 2004). 
308 Butler, supra note 183, at 157. In general, there have been pushes for greater 
democracy within the Catholic Church in recent years. See Jay P. Dolan, The Desire for 
Democracy in the American Catholic Church, in A DEMOCRATIC CATHOLIC CHURCH, 
supra note 268, at 113, 126 (“This desire for democracy in the church has resurfaced once 
again. Behind this new surge of democracy is a theology of church that is much more 
populist than the monarchical, clerical model of church that has prevailed since the mid-
nineteenth century. This new theology has produced such phenomena in the church as 
collegiality, parish councils, and pastoral letters written in an open, consultative 
manner”.); Hornsby-Smith, supra note 241, at 24 (summarizing research on the Catholic 
Church in Britain during the 1970s and 1980s that found many lay people desired more 
democratic decision-making in the Church). 
309 McCarthy, supra note 215, at 158. 
310 Id. at 159. 
311 Id. at 162. 
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outside time312, they are not likely to be deterred by the small costs of 
some basic research on their church. About half of Catholics and a third of 
churchgoers in many Protestant denominations want more power in 
financial decisions313; these individuals would surely be interested in 
additional information about church finances. Before choosing a church to 
attend and before deciding how much of their money to donate, at least 
some churchgoers would look up the Form 990, if it were available314. 
David M. Schizer has argued that such private monitoring is one of 
the principal benefits government derives from charitable deductions315. 
Because average donors have little or no influence on the organizations to 
which they give, they are “unlikely to invest the time” in monitoring 
them316. More meaningful monitoring is provided by large donors and 
those that concentrate their giving and give regularly317. Although only a 
few donors at each church will fit Schizer’s first criterion, many are likely 
to fit the latter two since for average churchgoers, their church is annually 
the single largest recipient of their gifts318.Many such donors are interested 
in more financial information from their churches and providing them 
with such information would improve accountability for churches. 
Thus, far from a group that should be excepted form the 
information return requirement, churches seem like the ideal organization 
to benefit from transparency. Donors to churches are not writing a check 
and putting in the mail to send to some far-off place; they are placing 
                                                          
312 The amount of volunteering for the local church varies across denominations. 
Hoge et al. found that the average hours volunteered each month ranged from 2.2 (for 
Catholics) up to 5.6 (for Baptists). HOGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 55. 
313 Id. at 42. 
314 Little empirical research has been done on why individuals choose to attend 
particular churches. Even in the studies that exist, financial transparency has not been 
considered. However, one study suggested that “[h]ow openly the church deals with 
disagreements and conflict” is the sixth-most important factor out of ten in predicting 
whether an attendee will stay at a particular church. Daniel V.A. Olson, Church 
Friendships: Boon or Barrier to Church Growth?, 28 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 432, 440 
(1989). This variable might be considered a proxy for how much individuals value 
transparency in their churches, suggesting that it is at least somewhat important. Of 
course, compared to the individual’s decision about whether to donate to a particular 
nonprofit, the decision whether to go to church is a good deal more complex. 
315 David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and 
the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 256–67 (2009). 
316 Id. at 260–61 
317 Id. at 261, 263. 
318 HOGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 50. 
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money in the collection plate at a building where they worship every 
Sunday. In numerous surveys, a significant number of churchgoers have 
expressed a desire for more transparency and accountability in their 
churches. Many of them care what happens to that money and have good 
incentives to monitor it319. 
 
  
D - Financial Transparency is Consistent with the Teachings of Many 
Churches 
 
Some charismatic church leaders have become notorious for preaching to 
congregations that God has ordained for them to be in power and that 
churchgoers should unquestioningly submit to their authority. For 
instance, Bishop Eddie Long told the Atlanta Journal-Constitution that a 
biblical leader should not have to answer to a board, and in his 
autobiography he called governmental checks like a board “ungodly”320. 
Others have emphasized that they are accountable only to God and should 
not have to answer to the public321.However, the proclamations made by 
these preachers are outside the mainstream of Christian teaching. 
Billy Graham, perhaps the Twentieth Century’s most famous 
evangelist, took a very different stance on accountability, outlined in an 
agreement he and several friends made in 1948 known as the “Modesto 
Manifesto”322. Graham had asked for advice on how he could navigate the 
temptations that had toppled other famous evangelists323. His friends and 
associates advised that, among other things, he needed toavoid greed by 
being financially accountable324. As a result, Graham’s organization went 
beyond the IRS’s disclosure requirements, publishing annual audits of 
                                                          
319 Although churchgoers may be unwilling to brazenly confront religious authority 
figures, they are probably still willing to engage in private monitoring that does not 
entail confrontation - certainly those who expressed a desire for greater financial 
transparency and accountability to pollsters would be likely to do so. Even knowing 
that donors are paying attention would probably cause at least some leaders to better 
steward those resources. 
320 Blake, supra note 195. 
321 Abelman, supra note 76, at 192. 
322 BILLY GRAHAM, JUST AS I AM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BILLY GRAHAM 
128, 679 (1997); Laurie Goodstein, Billy Graham Activates a Global Electronic Pulpit, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1995, at A1. 
323 GRAHAM, supra note 322. 
324 Id. 
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ministry finances and buying newspaper advertisement space in local 
papers to publish audits following major evangelistic campaigns325. In 
1979, Graham also partnered with another large Christian ministry to start 
the ECFA, an organization that accredits applicants who have 
demonstrated adherence to certain financial standards and best 
practices326. Graham’s biographer noted that one of Graham’s strengths 
was that “he has never thought that he was beyond temptation or that 
anything he wanted to do was all right”327. Unlike other televangelists 
such as Jim Bakker or Jimmy Swaggart, Graham tried to surround himself 
with people who were not afraid to tell him “no,” and he thought this was 
part of his Christian duty328. 
Graham’s views continue to be espoused by two of the 
organizations he helped create, the ECFA and Christianity Today, the 
leading evangelical Christian magazine. The ECFA has grown 
substantially since its founding in 1979, currently boasting about 1,700 
members with $20 billion in combined revenue329. Members are required 
to comply with the ECFA’s “Standards of Responsible Stewardship”330, 
which mandate practices such as board oversight, transparency, audited 
financial statements, truth in fundraising, and sound conflicts of interest 
policies331. When noncompliance is suspected-either through one of the 
more than 180 on-site field reviews the ECFA conducts each year332 or 
through donor complaints-the ECFA investigates, and if it determines that 
the organization is noncompliant, the ECFA may suspend or terminate its 
membership333. The ECFA is clear that it believes financial disclosure is a 
central part of the Christian faith: 
                                                          
325 Darren Barbee, Reverend Graham Has History of Financial Openness, Accountability, 
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 13, 2002. 
326 Id. More information on the ECFA is available on its website. ECFA, 
http://www.ecfa.org (last visited Sept. 5, 2013). 
327 Barbee, supra note 325. 
328 LONG, supra note 187, at 8; Goodstein, supra note 322. 
329 About ECFA, ECFA, http://www.ecfa.org/Content/About (last visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
330 ECFA, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR COMPLIANCE DETERMINATION, available 
at http://www.ecfa.org/pdf/GuidingPrinc.pdf. 
331 ECFA, ECFA’S SEVEN STANDARDS OF RESPONSIBLE STEWARDSHIP, 
available at http://www.ecfa.org/PDF/ECFA_Seven_Standards_of_Responsible_Stewardshi 
p.pdf. 
332 Field Review Program, ECFA, http://www.ecfa.org/Content/2MembManFieldReviewP r o  
gram (last visited Aug. 2, 2013). 
333 ECFA, supra note 330. 
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Financial disclosure is not only an accepted, expected, and required 
form of accountability in society at large, but it also represents the 
even higher standard of openness for Christian organizations 
operating in the forum of the Church. ... [T]he reputation of the 
Christian ministry in general is at stake334. 
 
Unfortunately, despite the fact that the ECFA was originally aimed at 
promoting voluntary financial accountability for churches, today only 
about 150 churches are accredited members of the ECFA335, an 
infinitesimal fraction of the more than 330,000 churches in the United 
States336. 
Christianity Today has a record of publishing articles reporting on 
financial abuses by Christian ministries and churches, and it has 
consistently advocated the value of transparency. The magazine has 
published a number of updates on the activities of the ECFA, including 
news about organizations that have been suspended by the accountability 
organization337. In a 2003 editorial, the magazine urged that all Christian 
organizations should operate with open books, including churches338. The 
editors wrote, “Although churches ... aren’t legally required to make 
financial statements available, they are morally obligated to do so”339. The 
editorial directed harsh criticism at church-based ministries that declined 
                                                          
334 ECFA Standard 5 - Transparency, ECFA, http://www.ecfa.org/Content/Comment5 (last 
visited July 24, 2013). 
335 Search of ECFA members with the category “Church: Local” or “Church: 
Multisite” on the ECFA website, eliminating duplicate results, ECFA, 
http://www.ecfa.org (last visited Nov.21, 2012). 
336 NAT’L COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A., supra note 9, 
at 377. 
337 See, e.g., Marshall Allen, ‘Naïve’ Bookkeeping, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Aug. 2003, at 
19–20 (reporting on the ECFA’s investigation of the Christian Research Institute for lack 
of internal controls and excessive salaries and benefits); Double-entry Accountability, 
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, May 2004, at 27 (summarizing programs at the ECFA and 
another Christian watchdog organization); ECFA Grows, but Loses Some Well-known 
Names, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Oct. 8, under investigation or because they claimed 
the organization was duplicative of other accountability systems already in place); 
Elizabeth Lawson, Accountability for Growth, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Sept. 2007, at 20–
21 (describing new ECFA membership option for small ministries and churches); Kim 
A. Lawton, ECFA Cites Problems at Samaritan’s Purse, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Aug. 17, 
1992, at 47 (discussing the ECFA’s suspension of Franklin Graham’s organization 
because of lack of board oversight). 
338 Open-book Ministry, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Jan. 2003, at 30–31. 
339 Id. at 30. 
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to voluntarily file a Form 990, noting that they were shortsighted, ignorant 
of reality, and out of step with their “higher obligation” to be transparent 
in all their doings340. Similarly, in a 2012 editorial denouncing Ponzi 
schemes that had been endorsed by pastors, the editors concluded that 
“[v]isible, public accountability” was essential for the success of Christian 
ministry341. 
Other Christian leaders and organizations have also actively urged 
greater transparency. For instance, Wall Watchers is a smaller complement 
to the ECFA342. The organization runs the website MinistryWatch.org, and 
publishes an annual “Donor Alert List” of the Christian ministries whose 
financial dealings are the most worrisome343. In addition to the 
transparency and oversight concerns raised by ECFA, Wall Watchers 
warns donors about outsized executive salaries and disproportionate 
fundraising expenses344. 
In a book on church finances, a seminary professor and an 
accounting professor warned church leaders: “There is no place for 
secrecy within the church”345. The authors cautioned that money, power, 
and secrecy are a toxic combination, and they recommended full financial 
transparency, down to the details of every financial transaction, including 
the pastor’s salary346. They made it clear that, not only is such 
transparency good management, but it is also consistent with Christian 
teaching on money347. 
Theologians within the Catholic Church have also embraced 
transparency. In its 1993 letter on pastoral stewardship, the U.S. 
Conference of Catholic Bishops wrote that the laity “ought to have an 
active role in the oversight of the stewardship of pastoral leaders”348. 
                                                          
340 Id. at 31. 
341 Pastors’ Ponzis, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Apr. 2012, at 65. 
342 Double-entry Accountability, supra note 336, at 27. 
343 Donor Alert Ministries, MINISTRY WATCH, http://www.ministrywatch.com/ministri 
es/ ministryarticles.aspx?type=alert (last visited Sept. 5, 2013). 
344 Double-entry Accountability, supra note 337, at 27. 
345 JAMIESON & JAMIESON, supra note 173, at 117. 
346 Id. at 118–19. 
347 Id. at 119, 129–30 (“[The pastor] can demonstrate disarming of the power of 
money by insisting that clear, forthright salary information about his compensation 
package be presented in the financial statements.”). 
348 347 Butler, supra note 183, at 155–56. However, many bishops have refrained 
from actually embracing this idea when it matters. For instance, the Archdiocese of 
New York has long refused public financial accountability. 
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James L. Heft has noted: “Long before this current crisis ... a clear doctrinal 
basis has existed for a more effective inclusion of the laity in the life of the 
church and for structures that support that inclusion”349. Eugene C. 
Bianchi and Rosemary Radford Ruether also found a doctrinal basis for 
transparency and accountability in the principle that Christians must 
wisely steward the gifts God has given them, and in the belief that the 
church consists of fallible sinners at all levels, including in the 
leadership350. 
Indeed, the earliest example of financial accountability in the 
church can be found in the New Testament, where the apostle Paul 
instructed the Corinthians to select trusted individuals from among them 
to deliver their financial gifts to the church in Jerusalem; Paul declined to 
personally take the money351.On the basis of Paul’s example, seminary 
professor Craig L. Blomberg commented: “Christians in all times and 
places should know what other believers are doing with their finances in 
ways that help to hold them accountable for good stewardship”352. 
Once one has accepted that even church leaders are sinners and that 
churchgoers have a moral obligation to ensure that their contributions are 
used wisely, it is axiomatic that churches must be open and accountable 
about their finances. Indeed, a policy of transparency would be consistent 
with the moral teachings professed by many Christian churches.  
 
 
E - Self-Regulation Is Insufficient to Prevent Financial Abuse 
 
As noted above, the Commission on Accountability and Policy for 
Religious Organizations, organized by the ECFA, has recommended that 
Congress not require churches to file the Form 990353. The Commission’s 
recommendation comes as no surprise given that the ECFA, despite its 
professed belief in the importance of transparency, has consistently 
opposed requiring churches to file the Form 990354. The position taken by 
                                                          
349 Heft, supra note 307, at 126. 
350 Bianchi & Ruether, supra note 268, at 258–59. 
351 1 Corinthians 16:3–4. 
352 CRAIG L. BLOMBERG, NEITHER POVERTY NOR RICHES: A BIBLICAL 
THEOLOGY OF POSSESSIONS 196 (2000). 
353 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
354 See, e.g., Senate Finance Committee, Grassley-ECFA Correspondence 2009, 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/download/?id=abb25810-a26e-4329-a4ed-42 
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the ECFA and many church leaders has been that churches and other 
religious organizations are capable of regulating themselves. However, 
history has proven them wrong.  
Most conspicuously, PTL was a member of the ECFA during much 
of the 1980s, right up until just before the scandal broke. Although the 
ECFA had concerns about PTL’s finances, it was unable to effect any 
change in the governance of the organization, and it was powerless to 
prevent the massive financial fraud that had been taking place at PTL 
during much of the time that PTL had been a member of the ECFA355. As 
Gordon Loux, then the chairman of the board of the ECFA, noted in 
defense of the ECFA’s failure to prevent the scandal: there are inherent 
limits to self-regulation, especially when such regulation depends upon 
the consent of the regulated356.The obvious import of that observation is 
that the ECFA cannot sufficiently regulate churches because the bad actors 
will never submit to the ECFA’s regulation.  
Ironically, as explained above, the ECFA was originally created in 
1979 in response to financial scandals at churches, and it was billed as a 
accredited by the ECFA, and Congress is still having conversations with 
church leaders about the need to do something to prevent the financial 
scandals that regularly engulf churches. Clearly, the ECFA has not solved 
the problem, nor is it conceivable that any regulatory regime that depends 
upon churches voluntarily submitting to regulation will ever be able to 
adequately ensure financial transparency and accountability. 
 
 
F - The Public Has a Right to Know What Happens to Taxpayer Money 
Funneled to Churches 
 
Unfortunately, not all church members care what happens to their 
donations. Zech has found that church members are frequently too 
trusting of their pastors357. Even in the midst of scandals, some supporters 
continue to blame negative press on “a liberal media controlled by 
Satan”358. Such reactions are consistent with Shupe’s argument that 
                                                                                                                                                               
4e692eb34f (last visited July 7, 2013). 
355 Hearing on Television Ministries (1987), supra note 84, at 207. 
356 Id. 
357 Brumley, supra note 11.  
358 WITHAM, supra note 246, at 178–79. 
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religious institutions are usually “trusted hierarchies”359, and that reality 
presents a strong case that self-policing in churches will never be 
sufficient. Even if the church laity will not-or cannot-act to hold their 
leaders accountable, because churches are subsidized by taxpayer money, 
the public also has a right to know what happens to it.  
 
 
IV - CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
 
Some religious leaders have suggested that there would be a constitutional 
barrier to imposing the requirements of section 6033 on churches360.For 
instance, in its correspondence with Senator Grassley, the ECFA indicated 
that it believes requiring churches to file the Form 990 would be 
unconstitutional361. Perhaps unsurprisingly, most of the legal experts 
chosen to advise the Commission on Accountability and Policy for 
Religious Organizations share that view362. However, their arguments 
misunderstand the First Amendment’s separation of church and state, and 
they ignore the ways in which churches are already regulated by the IRS 
and other state and local laws363. In fact, the special treatment that 
                                                          
359 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
360 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
361 Senate Finance Committee, Grassley-ECFA Correspondence 2009, 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/download/?id=abb25810-a26e-4329-a4ed-
424e692eb34f (last visited July 7, 2013). 
362 Position Papers, COMMISSION ON ACCOUNTABILITY & POL’Y FOR RELIGIOUS 
ORGS., http://religiouspolicycommission.org/PositionPapers.aspx?q=Recent (last visited Dec. 
28, 2012). 
363 One practitioner noted: 
The amenability of churches to some governmental regulation is 
not seriously disputed. For example, few would protest the 
application to churches of laws prohibiting fraud in the sale of 
securities, requiring donated funds to be expended for the purposes 
represented, protecting copyright owners against infringement, or 
prohibiting activities that cause physical harm, property damage, or 
material disturbance to others. Similarly, churches routinely comply 
with municipal building codes and zoning regulations in the 
construction and location of worship facilities. 
Michele Estrin Gilman, “Charitable Choice” and the Accountability Challenge: Reconciling the 
Need for Regulation with the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 55 VAND. L. REV. 799, 
877 n.383 (2002) (citing RICHARD R. HAMMAR, FEDERAL INCOME TAX ISSUES IN 
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AS NONPROFIT ENTITIES: ISSUES OF ACCESS, 
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churches currently receive under the Internal Revenue Code, including the 
exemption for churches under section 6033, may be a violation of the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.  
 
 
A - Removing the Exemption Would Not Violate Free Exercise 
 
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making any “law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof”364. Courts have long struggled to balance the Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clauses, allowing religion to be practiced freely while 
prohibiting the state from doing anything that would establish a particular 
religion, or religion in general365. Those religious leaders who oppose 
removing the exemption from section 6033 protest that requiring churches 
to file Forms 990 would violate their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. 
In other words, they contend that the Free Exercise Clause requires an 
exemption for churches. 
The Supreme Court has stated that a free exercise inquiry begins by 
asking “whether government has placed a substantial burden on the 
observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a 
compelling governmental interest justifies the burden”366. The Free 
Exercise Clause does not stop the government from imposing laws on 
religious organizations that may prove burdensome, if the state has a 
                                                                                                                                                               
SPECIAL STATUS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY § 9-01 (N.Y.U. Sch. Of Law, The Nat’l 
Ctr. on Philanthropy & the Law ed., 1983))). 
364 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
365 See, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (“[T]he Constitution 
prohibits, at the very least, legislation that constitutes an endorsement of one or another 
set of religious beliefs or of religion generally.”); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) (“[T]his Court repeatedly has recognized 
that tension inevitably exists between the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses, 
and that it may often not be possible to promote the former without offending the 
latter. As a result of this tension, our cases require the State to maintain an attitude of 
‘neutrality,’ neither ‘advancing’ nor ‘inhibiting’ religion.” (citing Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (citations omitted))); Walz v. Tax Comm’n. of N.Y., 
397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
366 Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment 
Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana 
Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–19 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220–21 
(1972)). 
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compelling interest in doing so367. In upholding the denial of tax benefits 
to Bob Jones University because of its ban on interracial dating, the Court 
acknowledged that the government’s action would have a “substantial 
impact” on the operation of such religious institutions, but the action 
encountered no constitutional barrier because it “will not prevent those 
schools from observing their religious tenets”368. 
More recently, the Court rejected similar arguments made by the 
state of Texas in defense of a sales tax exemption for religious 
materials369.The state argued that removing the exemption would violate 
the Free Exercise Clause, but the Court strongly rejected that argument: “It 
is virtually self-evident that the Free Exercise Clause does not require an 
exemption from a governmental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion 
in the program actually burdens the claimant’s freedom to exercise 
religious rights”370. To meet that test, the state would have needed to 
produce evidence that the sales tax would “offend their religious beliefs or 
inhibit religious activity,” which it did not do371. Similarly, in Jimmy 
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, the Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that the Free Exercise Clause required that religious 
publications be exempt from state sales tax372. The Court concluded that 
the collection and payment of a generally applicable tax imposed no 
constitutionally significant burden on religious belief or practice373. 
It is difficult to see how requiring churches to file the Form 990 
would impose any burden on religious belief or practice. Moreover, even 
if a church were to successfully argue that disclosure violated its religious 
beliefs, a court could still conclude that the government interest in 
collecting the information on the Form 990 justified the burden. The 
Supreme Court has rejected arguments that individuals should be exempt 
from certain taxes on the basis that those taxes violate their religious 
                                                          
367 See supra note 366 and the cases cited therein; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United 
States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983) (“However, ‘[n]ot all burdens on religion are 
unconstitutional ... . The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing 
that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.’” (quoting United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982))). 
368 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603–04. 
369 Tex. Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 18. 
370 Id. (quoting Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985)). 
371 Id. 
372 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990). 
373 Id. 
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beliefs, noting that “‘[t]he tax system could not function if denominations 
were allowed to challenge the tax system’ on the ground that it operated 
‘in a manner that violates their religious belief'”374. For all of the reasons 
considered in Part III, the government interest in collecting the 
information on the Form 990 is indeed compelling. 
Unfortunately, many arguments against requiring churches to file 
the Form 990 are premised on far-fetched theories about how the IRS 
could use the Form 990 to regulate religious beliefs and persecute 
believers. Even several of the position papers prepared by the 
Commission on Accountability for Religious Organizations contained 
such arguments375. Assertions by religious leaders that requiring churches 
to file the Form 990 would violate the Free Exercise Clause frequently 
depend upon appealing to anti-government phobia rather than 
constitutional law376. It is concerns about the political impact of such fears, 
more than any legitimate constitutional issue, that seems to have ossified 
religious preferences in the Internal Revenue Code377. 
 
 
B - The Current Exemption May Violate the Establishment Clause 
 
Some commentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
in Texas Monthly v. Bullock378 suggests that the Court would view the 
special treatment of churches in the Internal Revenue Code, including the 
                                                          
374 Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1989) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 
U.S. 252, 260 (1982)). 
375 See, e.g., the position papers authored by Michael P. Mosher (“What if the leaders 
in power were in fact hostile to religion? ... [A] plethora of opportunities would abound 
for potential discrimination and persecution... . [I]t invites and allows for misuse and 
discriminatory practices by government insiders such as regularly practiced in other 
less religiously tolerant countries.”) and Thomas J. Winters (“Who will protect those 
same church members from the government? Newton’s third law of motion states that 
forces always occur in opposite pairs, i.e. for every action there is an equal and opposite 
reaction. The action of imposing on churches annual disclosures through the Form 990 
will inherently result in the opposite reaction, a loss of religious liberties and 
surrendering a measure of control over our religion.”), supra note 362. 
376 See, e.g., supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text (statements made by D. Ja 
Kennedy, President and Founder, Coral Ridge Ministries and Ben Armstrong, Exec. 
Dir., Nat’l Religious Broadcasters, with respect to the 1987 hearing on television 
ministries). 
377 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
378 Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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exemption from filing the Form 990, as unconstitutional violations of the 
Establishment Clause379. 
In Texas Monthly, the Court was asked to decide whether a Texas 
sales tax exemption on religious publications violated the Establishment 
Clause380. The Court held that it did381. Finding that the special treatment 
for religious literature under the Texas statute lacked any secular purpose 
that could justify the preference, and that it endorsed religious belief in 
general, the Court ruled the state law unconstitutional382. Justice Brennan, 
writing the plurality opinion, did not mince his words, declaring the 
exemption a “blatant endorsement of religion”383. 
Likewise, the Form 990 exemption for churches lacks any secular 
purpose and favors religion, suggesting that it might also be 
unconstitutional under the reasoning in Texas Monthly. 
 
 
C. Requiring Churches to File the Form 990 Would Not Be Excessively 
Entangling 
 
In its opinion in Texas Monthly, the Court applied the standard originally 
articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which set out a tripartite test for 
evaluating whether a law violates the Establishment Clause: 
 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive 
government entanglement with religion”384. 
 
The state of Texas argued that this latter clause would be implicated if it 
had to tax religious publications, but the Court disagreed385. In fact, the 
Court found that the exemption produced a greater entanglement with 
                                                          
379 See Cohn, supra note 188; Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial Accountability of 
Churches for Federal Income Tax Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REV. 
71 (1991); Wendy Gerzog Shaller, Churches and Their Enviable Tax Status, 51 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 345 (1990). 
380 Tex. Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 5 (plurality opinion). 
381 Id. 
382 Id. at 17. 
383 Id. at 20. 
384 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citations omitted). 
385 Tex. Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 20. 
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religion because it required the state and the courts to determine what 
should be exempt386. Similarly, the exemption for churches under section 
6033 requires greater entanglement because courts and the IRS must 
determine what is and is not a “church”. To do so, the IRS and the courts 
must wade into intensely religious questions such as whether an 
organization has a recognized creed, an ecclesiastical government, a 
religious literature, and a distinct religious history387.If there were no 
exemption for churches, there would be no need for the IRS or the courts 
to try to answer such questions388. 
In 1989, after it decided Texas Monthly, the Supreme Court held in 
Hernandez v. Commissioner that disallowing those charitable deductions to 
the Church of Scientology that were actually disguised quid pro quo 
transactions was not excessively entangling, despite the fact that it 
required the IRS to examine the prices, services, payments, and other 
details about the transactions389. The Court held that “routine regulatory 
interaction which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine, no 
delegation of state power to a religious body, and no ‘detailed monitoring 
                                                          
386 Id.; see also Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (rejecting petitioners’ 
argument that their payments to the Church of Scientology, despite the quid pro quo 
nature of the payments, should be considered deductions because they were part of a 
religious service, noting that such an interpretation would require the IRS to distinguish 
between “secular” services and “religious” services and may be excessively entangling). 
387 See supra note 11; see also, e.g., Am. Guidance Found., Inc. v. United States, 490 F. 
Supp. 304 (D.D.C. 1980) (dissecting the practices, doctrine, teachings, worship, 
governance, congregation, etc. of purported church); Good v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M.. 
(CCH) 595 (2012) (same); Chambers v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1550 (2011) (same); 
Richardson v. Comm’r 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 14 (1995) (same); VIA v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 212 (1994) (same); First Church of In Theo v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1045 
(1989) (same). 
388 Ironically, given its opposition to requiring churches to file the Form 990, the 
Commission on Accountability and Policy for Religious Organizations wrote in its final 
report: “Applying and administering discriminating criteria for a filing exception [to the 
Form 990] would ensnare the government in a constitutionally problematic quagmire of 
inherently religious judgments, and would require probing into the depths of each 
religious organization’s structure, governance, and practices to determine whether the 
criteria are met”. COMM’N ON ACCOUNTABILITY & POLICY FOR RELIGIOUS 
ORGS., supra note 22, at 32. That the government is already ensnared in such a 
“constitutionally problematic quagmire of inherently religious judgments” was somehow 
lost on the Commission. The only way out of that quagmire is to end the Form 990 
exemption and other special exemptions for churches. 
389 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 696. 
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and close administrative contact’ between secular and religious bodies, 
does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command”390. 
Requiring churches to file the Form 990 would stop well short of 
the level of IRS involvement in examining the transactions in Hernandez. If 
a detailed examination of the prices and services exchanged as part of a 
religious practice is not excessively entangling, then surely asking 
churches to complete a tax form once a year is not entangling, and it does 
not involve any inquiry into religious doctrine. Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine a more “routine regulatory interaction”391. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has explained the history of the exemption from filing Form 
990 that churches enjoy under Code section 6033, and it has argued that 
the original purpose for the exemption no longer applies and that there 
are compelling reasons for Congress to amend the law to require church 
filing. As demonstrated by ongoing revelations of scandals and the 
egregious way in which several religious ministers refused Senator 
Grassley’s recent requests for financial information, this issue is as 
relevant today as it has ever been. Indeed, because many of the fastest-
growing and largest churches in America are independent, non-
denominational churches-which have less accountability than any other 
type of church-and because such churches make up an increasingly large 
percentage of the church landscape, financial transparency may be more 
important now than ever before392. 
Not only do the problems that necessitate accountability continue 
unabated, but the potential power of transparency has increased 
                                                          
390 Id. at 696–97 (citations omitted). 
391 See id. 
392 BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 2008 SUMMARY REPORT 5 (2009), available at 
http://commons.trincoll.edu/aris/files/2011/08/ ARIS_Report_2008.pdf (the percentage of 
Christians attending a non-denominational church has ballooned from 0.1 percent in 
1990 to 1.2 percent in 2001 and 3.5 percent in 2008); WARREN COLE SMITH, supra note 
192, at 39 (twenty-five percent of the nation’s 1,300 megachurches are 
nondenominational); Ed Stetzer, Life in Those Old Bones, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, 
June 2010, at 24 (many of the best known churches today have no denominational 
affiliation and nondenominational churches continue to grow steadily while mainline 
denominations are shrinking). 
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enormously during the last decade. The Internet has enabled the 
possibility of public monitoring that was once only theory. In seconds, 
donors can gain access to valuable financial information that provides 
them with data about where their contributions will be best spent. The 
knowledge that this information is so easily obtained by donors and by 
the press means that the Form 990 has power to check wayward 
nonprofits that it never before possessed. 
Requiring churches to file the Form 990 would increase their 
transparency and accountability, both to the IRS and to the public. Donors 
to churches themselves may have the most to gain from such reform since 
they are the ones whose contributions may be misspent and whose 
religious experiences may be tarnished by greedy leaders whose only real 
religion is profit. 
In summarizing the Court’s jurisprudence on the Establishment 
Clause, Chief Justice Burger wrote that the disputed statute must possess 
“a secular legislative purpose” and that “its principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion”393. On its face, the 
exemption under section 6033 seems to advance religion, excepting 
churches from disclosure and limiting public oversight. However, it may 
in fact inhibit religion-allowing charlatans to hide their unscrupulous 
financial misdeeds behind a cloak of religious fervor. It is time for 
Congress to remove this exemption.  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Most tax-exempt organizations are required to file the IRS Form 990, an 
information return that is open to the public. The Form 990 is used by watchdogs 
and donors to learn detailed financial information about charities. However, 
churches are exempt from filing the Form 990 and need not disclose any financial 
information to the IRS, the public, or their donors. In December 2012, the 
Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability recommended to Senator 
Charles Grassley that Congress should preserve the exemption, despite recent 
financial scandals at churches.  
Examining the legislative history, this Article argues that the primary 
function of the information return has become its utility to donors, and 
policymakers have recognized the role that public access can play in keeping 
                                                          
393 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
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nonprofits honest and efficient. Unfortunately, because churches do not have to 
be transparent or accountable, few of them are.  
Using research and insights from sociology, this Article contends that 
because of their opacity and the unique nature of religious authority, churches 
are more likely to foster and shelter malfeasance. Churchgoers are unlikely to 
challenge leaders because doing so can endanger their position in the religious 
community, making it imperative that transparency be mandated by outside 
authorities. Ironically, increased transparency may actually be good for churches 
because, as studies suggest, it is likely to increase donations and because, by 
minimizing opportunities for financial improprieties, it may preserve the 
religious experience of churchgoers. In addition, transparency is consistent with 
the teaching of many Christian leaders and with the expressed preferences of a 
large portion of churchgoers. 
